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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose o f this case study research is to investigate the nature o f the
decision-making processes used by local government leaders in the decision to
privatize public services. The nature o f the decision-making processes encompass
the identification o f the problems, solutions, or alternatives investigated, the
environment in which the decision was made, and an examination o f the key
participants in the process. Understanding the decision-making process requires an
analysis o f how decision makers think about difficult problems and the limitations o f
human decision-making ability. Privatization was chosen as an issue in these case
studies since it is typically a difficult policy decision and is beyond the day-to-day
decision-making authority exercised by most public managers.
By investigating and gaining an understanding o f the difficult and often
contentious decision to privatize public services, this research study can assist public
officials in improving the quality o f their decision making and the choices they make.
This research will enable public officials to think more clearly about objectives,
alternatives, consequences, and uncertainties, and enable them to integrate
judgments with other types o f information in a logical and defensible manner. To
accomplish these research goals, it was necessary to question key stakeholders to
understand the perspective o f an individual making decisions in an organizational

1
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environment. While there may be differing styles o f decision making among public
decision makers— autocratic, democratic or laissez-faire (Eddy, 1981; Fiedler,
1967)— most municipal charters require a democratic process allowing for public
debate o f issues such as is considered in this research.
Decision making at any level o f government is bounded by its organizational
and political environment. Organizational structure, legal boundaries, limited
resources, as well as politics from within and outside o f the organization often
seriously affect decision making. In fact, most public executives would agree that
decision making in their organizations is not a smoothly flowing process
disseminating choices when and where they are required. Rather, it is a circuitous,
disjointed, halting flow o f interactions between people, interactions that shift
constantly as a result o f internal and external environmental forces. These interactive
forces can range from organizational processes to political control.
Public officials often find themselves in a paradoxical position. I f they take
the time necessary to collect information on a problem and an appropriate solution,
they are criticized for a slow response (Sobel, 2006). But if, on the other hand, they
respond quickly, without a complete analysis o f an issue, they are criticized for
making an uninformed decision. In defense o f decision makers, Hoy and Tarter
(1998) said that a public official could make a right and timely decision and still be
ineffective. This doesn’t mean that the decision-making process is flawed, but rather
it is a commentary on the complexity o f organizational decision making in the public
sector. Recognizing the complexity o f public decision making does not excuse
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public officials from the duty to apply appropriate decision processes and the use o f
sound, rational judgment.
This research studies the decision-making process o f six Michigan cities by
examining the internal and external environmental factors and the role these play in
the decision to privatize public services. A six-step classical decision-making model
is used to develop research questions assessing the correlation to four organizational
decision-making models: the rational model, the bounded rational model, the public
choice model, and the contingency model.
The literature review in Chapter II briefly considers general decision-making
theory followed by an analysis o f the four decision-making models. The rational
model is presented as a decision model that is foundational to a number o f the
models present in the literature and is considered by many to be the ideal model. The
comprehensive rational model is very detailed and demanding in its process and is
arguably only an ideal. The comprehensive rational model assumes that a decision
maker has complete information and the ability to evaluate and rank the alternatives.
The bounded rational model is presented as a realistic evolution o f the rational
theory o f decision making as applied to an organizational environment. Unlike the
rational model, the bounded rational model recognizes the limits o f human
knowledge in the identification o f solutions to problems. Bounded rational theorists
assume that decision makers are comfortable making decisions with incomplete
information and are willing to accept the first alternative that is “good enough.” The
public choice model introduces a decision model specific to characteristics found in
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public organizations. The public choice theory assumes that politicians are rational
and that they will pursue their own self-interest and make decisions that will increase
their own political power and votes. Finally, the literature o f the contingency
decision theory is presented as a possible framework used by public officials to make
the difficult decision o f whether or not to privatize. The contingency model is
presented as a framework upon which to identify and understand internal and
external environmental factors that influence changes in an organization’s decision
approach.
The methodology section, Chapter III, discusses the research strategy used
to examine the decision-making approach in each o f the cities considered in this
study. The research method outlines the steps used in the development o f research
questions, selection o f the cities, collection o f the data, and how those data are
analyzed.
The analysis o f interview and secondary data is included in Chapter IV o f
this research and provides a city-by-city discussion o f the history o f each decision
case.
Chapter V provides conclusions, interpretations o f the research findings, and
recommendations for future research. This chapter examines correlations between
the cases looking for patterns and applications o f particular decision models in
specific circumstances as well as implications to the practice o f public
administration. The chapter ends with a review o f the research purpose and
recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

General Decision Theory

Decision theory is a multidisciplinary subject that can be found in the
literature o f all o f the major disciplines. Decision making is often discussed in
relation to organizations, management, planning, problem solving, and many other
aspects o f organizational theory. The literature is so extensive that it is imperative to
set some limits on the material included in this research. This research focuses on
how local government officials make difficult, non-routine decisions focusing
specifically on the decision to privatize public services. Accordingly, the decision
literature reviewed narrowly focuses on decision making in public organizations that
apply in this context. Limitations related to this focus are further discussed as a part
o f the methods section o f this research.
Much o f the literature on organizational decision making stresses “making
choices” as a principal concept (McGowan, 1988; Starling, 2005). Yet, while there
may be general consensus that choosing is one step in the process, most would
define decision making in a much broader sense (Simon, 1960). Taylor (1965)
believes that decision making includes the entire analytical process related to the
problem leading up to a decision choice. Simon (1960) contends that decisions can
be separated into two categories: routine day-to-day situations requiring little or no
5
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thought, and complicated situations that involve competing interests or goals
requiring considerable expenditure o f resources. The decision to privatize public
services is a more complicated, non-routine decision that requires a more
comprehensive process and the identification o f a number o f possible alternative
solutions (Bazerman, 1990; Rainey, 1997).
Robert McGowan (1988) defines a decision as “the exercise o f judgment in
any particular situation.” Alvar Elbing (1978) says that “to make a decision (means)
to make a judgment regarding what one ought to do in a certain situation after
having deliberated on some alternative courses o f action.” Herbert Simon (1960)
considered decision making to be synonymous with administration and management.
Leonard Sayles (1979) referred to decision making as “an organizational process
that is shaped by the patterns o f interaction o f managers.” This research looks at the
act o f choosing between alternatives as well as the bureaucratic process involved
with that decision.
All public organizational decision models are subject to a number o f
constraints. In government, decision makers must operate within the boundaries o f
legal or statutory authority, organizational structures, and time constraints. The
decision to privatize a public service, for example, would be considered a “policy
level decision.” As such, according to the organizational boundaries o f the “councilmanager” form o f government, the final policy decision would be made by an
elected board.
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While there are a number o f different decision-making models, most o f them
have in common a similar series o f steps in the process. A typical decision-making
process would include: (1) identification o f a problem and its causes, (2)
identification o f possible alternative solutions, (3) weighing the alternative solutions,
(4) selecting an alternative, (5) implementation, and (6) evaluation o f the choice and
whether to begin the process again, if necessary (Eddy, 1981).
Step 1 in the decision-making process involves problem identification and, in
a public organization, is closely associated with setting the agenda (Dye, 2002).
Questions related to the decision process for local government would be: who
identified this issue as a problem, whether it is a symptom o f another problem,
whether there is consensus in the organization that the problem is hindering or
blocking organizational goals.
Step 2 in the decision-making process includes the identification and
consideration o f possible alternative solutions and often provides a central point o f
distinction between the various decision models. A manager is typically assigned the
duty o f investigating an issue and reporting back to the board with possible
recommendations. Another possible path would be for a board member to both
present a problem and a solution. The development o f alternatives for difficult
problems in some models requires significant research and analysis prior to a
decision.
Step 3 in the decision-making process involves weighing alternative
solutions. Alternatives are ranked based upon some criteria. That measurement may
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be a manager provided analytical instrument, a cost benefit analysis, or as simple as
a call for hands o f those in favor o f a particular option. Alternatives may be selected
based upon a number o f factors that range from the analytical analysis, public
pressure from special interest groups, or an intuitive judgment based upon an
individual decision maker’s personal perspective. Decision models vary widely on
this step o f the decision process as to what provides the basis for a decision. The
question is whether a decision maker is selecting the best alternative for the
community or for themselves or whether it is the best solution for the period o f time.
Step 4 in the decision-making process involves the selected o f an alternative.
When an alternative has been selected, a manager is typically charged with its
implementation.
Step 5 in the decision-making process involves the implementation o f a
decision. Implementation o f the solution allows for an interpretation o f the decision
which may impact the effectiveness o f the chosen solution. The presence o f
sufficient resources may also affect the success o f this critical step o f the decision
process.
Step 6 in the decision-making process includes evaluation o f the choice. In
most organizations this step is often not performed or is performed only on an
annual basis.
Figure 1 summarizes the formal decision-making process found in most local
governments. As suggested by the literature, it is typically comprised o f five or six
steps that generally begins with identifying a problem. While these steps are
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sometimes collapsed or expanded, the following illustration essentially represents a
classical decision process as found in the literature (Eddy, 1981; McGowan, 1988;
Simon, 1960; Starling, 2005).

Problem Identification
Development o f Alternatives
Evaluation o f Alternatives
Selection o f Solution
Implementation o f Solution
Evaluation o f Solution

Figure 1. The Classical Decision Process.

These steps provide a benchmark for the evaluation o f variations from what
is considered by many to be the ideal process in decision making. This core model o f
decision making also provides the points o f comparison between the various theories
o f decision making considered in this research, as can be seen in the methods section
o f this research.
Public management literature suggests that the decision-making processes in
public organizations is distinctive due to its political environment as compared to
that o f the private sectors (Rainey, 1997, 2003; Starling, 2005). Public organizations
have a different level o f complexity and dynamics than that o f private organizations.
Political issues o f power and control add a unique dimension to the public decision
making process. In addition, the environment o f the democratic process requires
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transparency, accountability to the public and, in some instances, public input in the
decision processes. Public decision-making literature is closely tied to organizational
theory issues o f power and leadership since power often determines who makes the
decision. In local government, formal power o f elected and appointed official is
delineated in a city’s municipal charter. The decision making considered in this
research is bounded within the context o f the council-manager form o f government.
The literature on decision making includes many different decision-making
models. The multitude o f decision-making approaches appears in the literature for
the reason that not one approach fits every organization or situation. For the
purpose o f this research, the decision to privatize public services was analyzed from
four organizational decision-making models: the rational model, the bounded
rational model, the public choice model, and the contingency model.

Rational Decision Model

Rational decision making refers to a logical step-by-step approach to
decision making with a thorough analysis o f alternatives and their consequences.
The rational model o f decision making comes from classical economic theory and
contends that the decision maker is completely rational in his or her approach to
achieving the organization’s goals (Downs, 1957). The rational theory seeks to
explain the behavior o f individuals and organizations and has efficiency as the
ultimate goal o f the process. Hezri and Hasan (2004) describe the rational model as
assuming that “humans are entirely rational beings. In economic thought, to be
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rational is to select from a group o f alternative courses o f action, which maximizes
output for a given input, or minimizes input for a given output.” Many rational
theorists would argue that the goal o f decision making in any organization, including
government, should be to get the biggest bang for the buck (Fesler and Kettl, 1991).
Hezri and Hasan also describe the rational model as a “utopian goal,” as most policy
decisions have so many unanticipated consequences.
A number o f governmental reforms over the past several decades have
proposed approaches that included elements o f rational decision making (Rainey,
2003). Rationality has various meanings and characteristics, but in political sciences,
the rational decision-making process would involve the following components:
1. Decision makers clearly define all the relevant goals.
2. Decision makers clearly know the values used in assessing those goals
and can rank order them according to their preferences.
3. Decision makers consider all alternative means for achieving the goals.
4. Decision makers will choose the most efficient o f the alternative means
for maximizing the goals.
In practice, these strict conditions are rarely met, except for simple decision
situations that may occur on a regular basis (Bazerman, 1990; Fesler and Kettl,
1991; Rainey, 2003). The decision to privatize would generally not fit these criteria.
This is, however, the ideal or standard that many public officials hold out as their
process for making decisions. In reality, decisions are made within the bounds o f
limited knowledge and time as was suggested by Herbert Simon (1947, 1957).
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M arch and Simon (1958) suggested that decision making is bounded by knowledge
and that we can better understand decision making by explaining actual, rather than
normative, decision processes.

Bounded Rational Model

Simon (1947) advanced the idea that decision making is constrained by the
ability o f public officials to collect or process relevant information. This becomes
more o f a reality as decisions become more political and complex (Jones, 1999).
Herbert Simon, an early critic o f the rational model, called his model bounded
rationality. It reflected the limits placed on the rational decision-making process by
such real-world considerations as a decision maker’s inability to secure and process
all information relevant to the decision (Simon, 1960). The bounded rationality
model has four assumptions: (1) Decision makers select the first alternative that is
satisfactory; (2) Decision makers recognize that their conception o f the world is
simple; (3) Decision makers are comfortable making decisions without determining
all the alternatives; (4) Decision makers make decisions by guidelines or heuristics
(Gore, 1964; Simon, 1960).
Bounded rationality assumes that decision makers satisfice; that is, they
select the first alternative that is “good enough,” because the costs o f optimizing in
terms o f time and effort are too great (Gore, 1964). Hezri and Hasan (2004)
indicate that one o f the major differences between the rational and bounded rational
theories is the need for the rational decision maker to maximize output. That is, that
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the rational decision maker seeks to collect and evaluate all information about
possible alternatives and solutions simultaneously. Bounded rational decision makers
seek to satisfice, or select an alternative that is sufficient rather than the best
alternative. The theory recognizes the limits o f time, resources, and human
knowledge.

Public Choice Model

Public choice theory was originally developed by economists seeking to
study and explain political or non-market decision-making behavior. The public
choice theory, which is sometimes called the rational choice theory or the social
choice theory, has been adapted and used by political scientists to explain
organizational decision making in political environments (Ostrom, 1989; Savas,
1982; Anderson, 2006). The basic premise o f the theory is that human beings are
rational and seek to maximize things that are important to them. The most rational
thing, the theory says, is to promote one’s self interest (Fesler & Kettl, 1991).
Early economic literature made a distinction between public and private
decision makers. Private decision makers were seen as self interested profit seekers,
while public officials were characterized as altruistic public servants seeking the best
means to serve the public’s interest (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Economic theory
assumed that a self interested decision maker would seek to maximize personal
benefits, whereas the political science theory assumed that a public-minded decision
maker would seek to maximize societal welfare. Public choice theorists challenged
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the idea that individuals act differently in politics than they do in the market place.
The public choice school asserts that all political decision makers, legislators,
bureaucracies, governments, seek to maximize their personal benefits in politics as
well as in the marketplace (Dye, 2002). Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argued that
individuals come together in politics for their own mutual benefit, just as they come
together in the marketplace by agreement to enhance their own self interest. Thus,
people will seek their own self-interest in both politics and the marketplace, but even
with selfish motives they can mutually benefit with collective decision making.
Buchanan and Tullock said that this should be expected because governments are
made up o f individuals who operate from self-interest in the market economy or in
politics (Anderson, 2006; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). Consequently, a public
official operating within the public choice model would look to the ends, furthering
their own agenda, without much regard to the means o f accomplishing their
objectives. As a result, a public official may promote their own interest rather than
the interests o f the community (Anderson, 2006).
One o f the assumptions o f the public choice theory is that individuals do not
make formal calculations o f the cost and benefits o f each alternative. The theory
indicates that individuals only act as if they make such calculations and use them in
choosing courses o f action (Levine, 1978). In other words, they go through the
process o f gathering cost and benefit information, but do not always consider this an
important factor.
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Public choice theory helps to explain why politicians generally fail to offer
clear policy alternatives in elections. Political candidates are not interested in
advancing principles, but rather in winning elections. To attract contributions and
support for their agenda, public leaders must compete for supporters and money
(Dye, 2002). In an attempt to win elections, public decision makers tend to move
toward the center o f the ideological spectrum to appeal to the greatest number o f
voters maximizing their voting support.
Public choice theory also helps us to understand the effect o f interest groups
on public decision makers. It is easy to see how politicians can improve their
election prospects by catering to special interest groups. Since their personal stake is
large, members o f the special interest group have a vested interest in letting their
elected official know how strongly they feel about an issue. Many o f the special
interest groups will vote for or against candidates solely on the basis o f whether they
support their agenda. As a consequence, politicians tend to reject meaningful
alternatives in favor o f supporting special interest positions that favor their own
interest. Due to these factors, decision making from a public choice perspective
often leads to short sighted decisions (Gwartney, Stroup, & Sobel, 2000).
Paul Starr (1989) in “The Meaning o f Privatization” felt that where selfinterest leads to benign results in the marketplace, it produces nothing but pathology
in political decisions. These pathological patterns represent different kinds o f “free
riding” by voters, bureaucrats, politicians, and recipients o f public funds. Coalitions
o f voters seeking special advantage from the government join together to get
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favorable legislation enacted. Rather than being particularly needy, these groups are
likely to be those whose stake in a benefit arouses them to more effective action
than is taken by the taxpayers at large over whom the increased tax costs are spread.
In general, individuals with “concentrated” interests in increased expenditure take a
“free ride” on those with “diffuse” interests in lower taxes. Similarly, public officials
seek to maximize budgets, and thereby gain greater power, larger salaries, and other
perquisites.
Relating the public choice theory to the privatization decision, Price (2005)
notes that the decision to privatize public services continues to be a major source o f
controversy. Price remarks that
the preponderance o f research on privatization has tended to focus on
questions o f efficiency; in other words, is the private sector able to provide
public services at a cost savings to taxpayers? Even though some o f this
research shows that private firms do not always save costs, governments
continue to justify decisions to privatize on the basis o f cost efficiency.
Like the Price study, this study does not intend to look at the advantages or
disadvantages o f privatization, but rather to examine the decision process
surrounding this decision.
Yager (1999) felt that economic explanations o f the public choice theory fail
to account for political aspects o f the model. Yager concluded that public choice
theorists should be aware o f political conditions and forces that affect the decision
to privatize. Those conditions were primarily employee and union opposition to
privatization that developed council and community support.
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This research takes into consideration both the economic and political
aspects o f the public choice theory as well as the political force field that surrounds
this sometimes difficult decision. This research is distinguished from the Yager study
in that it goes beyond why cities privatize by examining the decision processes and
the environmental factors that lead to their adoption. While “politics” is a part o f the
decision process, it does not fully explain it. Yager’s research concluded that
privatization decisions are quite complex and incorporate both economic and
political factors. This research examines the complexity o f that decision and is
inclusive o f economic and political factors as well as many others.

Contingency Model

M ost would agree that there is no single best way o f making decisions that
will apply in all situations. Contingency theory underlines the fact that our social and
political environment is always subject to change. No single rule or decision-making
approach will solve problems every time, for all individuals or all organizations.
Public decision makers must study the internal and external environment to
determine the best course o f action prior to making decisions. In today’s complex
political environment, decisions and decision models must be flexible and fast
changing in order to adapt to the environment.
Some organizations facing difficult problems or a hostile environment may
deviate from their typical decision process. Others may start with one decision
approach only to shift to another during the decision process. The contingency
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theory suggests that effective organizational decision making should adapt to the
demands o f the external environment. The contingency model provides a framework
to identify environmental factors that indicate the best approach based upon the
circumstances (Hoy & Miskel, 1991; Hoy & Tarter, 1998,2004).
Wettenhall (2001) suggests that the decision to privatize public services is
often the result o f combinations o f both ideological and pragmatic contingencies
within a fluctuating political and ideological environment. These contingencies are
the basis for the type o f decision which would indicate a contingency approach to
decision making. The challenge o f the contingency theory is finding under what
conditions a particular model will be optimized in making a decision. For example,
under some circumstances the bounded rational model o f decision making may be
the best fit. If the problem is narrow and concrete and the decision maker can
predict with a high level o f certainty the outcome o f the defined alternatives, the
bounded rational model may fit the circumstances. As the decision-making
environment becomes more complex and dynamic, however, the information
requirements and additional resources necessary to analyze numerous alternatives
makes the bounded rational approaches less feasible. Public decision makers then
turn to intuitive and experience-based political decisional approaches, such as the
public choice model. Public organizational theorists have developed the contingency
theory as a framework to facilitate decision making when faced with variations in
the decision-making environment.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19
James Thompson (1967) suggested a contingency framework that explains
how to identify variations in the decision-making environment that would suggest a
particular method o f decision making based on the variations. He identified two
major dimensions: the degree to which the decision makers agree on goals and the
degree to which they have well-developed technical knowledge about how to solve
the problems and accomplish the tasks. Where both goal agreement and technical
knowledge are high, a bounded rational decision-making model should be used.
Richard Daft (1989), following a similar framework, believed that goal
consensus and technical knowledge concerning the means to achieve those goals
were fundamental to identifying the best decisional process. According to Daft, goal
consensus is simply the agreement among decision makers about which
organizational goals to pursue. When goals are unambiguous and consensus is clear,
they also provide a clear policy alternative. When goals are not agreed upon and
problem identification is uncertain, decision makers often turn to a more political
decision approach, such as the public choice model.
Technical knowledge, the second dimension in D aft’s (1989) contingency
decision model, refers to understanding and agreement about how to reach
organizational goals. A clear understanding o f technical knowledge is vital to the
problem/solution stage o f decision making. When the means are clear, the
appropriate solutions can be identified and the outcomes calculated with some
degree o f certainty. When the means are poorly understood, potential solutions are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

not well defined and the outcomes uncertain. Decision making from a contingency
perspective depends on intuition, judgment, and trial and error (Daft, 1989).
According to Beach and Mitchell (1978), decision makers need to take into
consideration factors related to the problem and the decision environment. The
environmental factors would include the level o f irreversibility o f the decision, the
relative significance o f the decision, the accountability structure, and fiscal
constraints. In choosing a decision-making method, public officials often
compromise between their desire to make correct decisions and the amount o f time
and resources they put into the decision-making process. Kreitner and Kinicki
(1998) believe that a full understanding o f contingency considerations help public
officials to make better decisions. As an analytical tool, the contingency model
assists in an understanding o f how public officials select solutions.
Kenney (1987) identified strategic contingencies as a part o f a study o f
public and private organizations. This study analyzed major decisions in 30 private
and public organizations, including local governments. The researchers in this study
examined which internal and external departments were involved in major decision
making and how much influence they had. The private organizations and their public
sector counterparts had similar patterns o f departmental involvement. For example,
for all organizations, accounting and auditing departments were most frequently
involved in making major decisions. In the public organization, however, external
government agencies became involved much more often. In the local government
organizations, committees or commissions that decide on resources and policies had

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
the strongest influence, while in the private organizations these groups were rated as
having the lowest influence. The study also showed that the external government
agencies were rated as having little influence on the public organizations, but as
having very high influence over the private organizations. Kenney suggests that this
may mean that public sector officials take for granted the influence o f external
agencies, while the private sector managers react negatively to government
interventions. Overall, the study indicates that governmental agencies that produce
and distribute primary goods and services have a strong influence in both public and
private organizations. How these agencies deal with strategic dependencies will be
reflected in their policy making decisions.
Applying the contingency theory o f decision making to the question o f
whether or not to privatize public services, an examination o f the conditions for
privatization must be undertaken. Rainey (2003) has identified six contingency areas
directly related to the privatization decision. Rainey developed his contingency
theory o f privatization from the contingencies that public officials must deal with in
their decision to privatize. The six contingencies considered as a part o f this analysis
include:
1. Internal and external environment,
2. Organizational goals and values,
3. Leadership and organizational culture,
4. Organizational structure and capacity,
5. Organizational decision-making process, and
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6. The existence o f measures o f performance and effectiveness.
Rainey emphasizes that these contingencies affect the privatization decision
making process, but may not all apply in all situations. Recognizing and dealing with
these contingencies becomes a crucial part o f good governmental decision making.
(Rainey, 2003, pp. 420-424) In practice, public officials should adapt their decision
making approach to the requirements o f each particular situation. Decision-making
policies and practices should be responsive to environmental changes if effective
decisions are to be made. Effective decision making is directly related to an
organization’s ability to diagnose and deal with quickly changing environment.
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CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This research analyzes the decision-making process used by public officials
in six Michigan cities. A multi-site case study design guided the development o f a
research strategy and the methodology. The purpose o f this study is to describe and
analyze how and why cities make the decision to privatize or not privatize public
services. While the literature is replete with discussions o f the types o f services cities
have chosen to privatize (International City/County Management Association
[ICMA], 1992, 1997, 2002), why a city should or should not consider privatizing
public services (Savas, 1987; Starr, 1989), as well as the economics o f privatization
(Hartley & Parker, 1991, Sclar, 1997), little has been said concerning the decision
process surrounding the privatization decision in local government.

Research Design

This research was based upon various forms o f data collection including an
analysis o f national longitudinal survey data from the International City/County
Manager Association (ICMA) for the years 1995 to 2002, in-depth interview data,
city minutes and budgets, memos, news articles, and relevant electronic data.
The ICMA survey data provided the initial list o f Michigan cities which had
considered privatization, as well as a guideline for the purposeful sample that was
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taken from this larger population. ICMA surveys have been conducted every 5 years
since 1982 and include all counties with populations over 25,000 and all cities with
populations over 10,000. Warner and Hefetz (2001b) used these data in their
Economic Policy Institute article, “Privatization and the M arket Role o f Local
Government.” This study, like the ICMA study, excluded cities with populations
under 10,000.
This research examined the decision to privatize from the perspective o f four
major decision-making models: the rational model, the bounded rational model, the
public choice model, and the contingency model. Summaries o f indicators for each
o f these models are found in Figures 2 through 5 below. The central tenets and
indicators provided the basis for analysis o f the data collected in this study.
To investigate the decision models used by government officials in their
decision to privatize, questions were designed following the classical model o f the
decision-making process. The steps o f the decision-making process include: (1)
identification o f a problem and its causes, (2) identification o f possible alternative
solutions, (3) weighing the alternative solutions, (4) selecting an alternative, (5)
implementation, and (6) evaluation o f the choice and whether to begin the process
again. These steps in the decision-making process provided the basis for collecting
data on the actual decision-making process found in each of the cities studied.
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Rational Model
Central Tenets and Assumptions:
•

Easy, accurate perception o f what constitutes the problem

•

Assumes the problem to be solved is clear and unambiguous

•

A single, well-defined goal is to be achieved

•

Assumes complete information—All alternatives and consequences are
known

•

The decision maker can calculate the probability o f success for each
alternative

•

Assumes complete objectivity and that the decision maker has a consistent
system o f preferences which is used to choose the best alternative

•

The final choice will be completely rational and optimal

•

Decision makers will adhere to the cost analysis for their decision

Indicators for Case Analysis:
•

Consensus on problem

•

Goal clarity

•

Multiple solutions presented and ranked by preference

•

Measures o f financial and other quantitative performance presented

•

Existence o f evaluation tools

•

Decision makers will choose the most efficient solution

Figure 2. Rational Model.
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Bounded Rational Model
Central Tenets and Assumptions:
•

Decision makers scan the environment for conditions that call for a decision

•

Decision makers accept limited information and are comfortable making
decisions without determining all the alternatives

•

Decisions are made on the basis o f previous experience

•

Incremental solutions are sought to solve problems

•

Decision makers recognize the limits o f the human mind and that they do not
have all possible information and yet are willing to make a decision

Indicators for Case Analysis:
•

Decision makers tend to wait for the problem to be presented—reactive
rather than proactive

• Potential to look at symptoms rather than problems
• Limited alternatives or solutions are presented
• Only one or a limited number o f problems are presented
• Slow, costly, reliance on flawed memory, obtain too little or too much
information
•

Decision making will be more intuitive, based upon personal experience as
opposed to rational analytical approaches

•

First satisfactory alternative presented may be selected

•

Short term or temporary solutions are used to solve a problem

•

Potential ignorance or miscalculation o f values and probabilities; criteria
include political factors

•

Evaluation may involve justification or escalation to recover costs, faulty
hindsight

Figure 3. Bounded Rational Model.
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Public Choice Model
Central Tenets and Assumptions:
• Decision makers identify problems based on self-interest
• Decision makers select alternatives and solutions that maximize personal
benefits
• Decision makers will protect and expand their budgets
• Politicians maximize votes, power, authority and resource base rather than a
disinterested pursuit o f public interest
• Special interest groups seek to maximize their influence
•

The role o f the government is relative to the interest o f the decision maker

•

Individual preferences or values become more important than that o f the
organization or community as a whole

Indicators for Case Analysis:
•

Decision results in increase in political power or control as a result o f a
policy position or vote

•

Very little cost/benefit analysis is used in the decision process or is not a
primary factor in the final decision— efficiency is not critical to the decision
maker

• Special interest groups influence the decision
• Decision makers actively seek public or special interest group participation
•

Decisions require increasing rewards to keep or improve absolute and
relative positions with voters or special interest groups

•

Elections may trigger the need to influence either voters or politicians

•

Individuals come together in politics for their own mutual benefit

•
•

Politician formulate their policies to win elections, successful reelection
based on policy positions or votes
Politicians generally fail to offer clear policy alternatives in elections

•

Public leaders must compete for supporters and money

•

Decision provides increased services for the decision maker and/or a special
interest group

•

Decision maker preferences become more important than that o f the
community

•

Politicians will tend to reject meaningful alternatives in favor o f supporting
special interest positions that favor their own interest

•

Public officials manipulate rules to produce preferred decisions

Figure 4. Public Choice Model.
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Contingency Model
Central Tenets and Assumptions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•

There is no single best way o f making decisions that will apply in all situations
Contingencies are the basis for the type o f decision approach
Ideological and pragmatic contingencies influence the decision process
Objections have a greater or lesser effect on the decision maker
Decision making from a contingency perspective depends on intuition,
judgment, and trial and error
The degree to which decision makers have well-developed technical
knowledge about how to solve the problems and accomplish the tasks will
dictate the best decision model
Non-analytic methods are employed when the problem seems familiar,
straightforward, or stable
Conversely analytic methods are employed if a problem is unfamiliar,
ambiguous, complex, or the environment unstable
The decision environment controls the alternatives considered and chosen

Indicators for Case Analysis:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

Internal and external decision environment
Public officials disagree concerning the organizational goals or values
Inability to reach a consensus on the problem or possible solutions
Weak organizational leadership, structure and or capacity
Ineffective organizational decision-making process
Environmental factors make the problem too complex for the decision makers
The existence o f internal committees influencing the decision-making process
Noticeable lack o f technical knowledge related to the problem or solutions
leads to a high dependence on management for decision task
Noticeable lack o f technical knowledge lead to a high dependence on outside
professionals for decision task
Unstable political environment
Public decision makers then turn to intuitive and experience-based political
decisional approaches rather than the highly rationalized process found in the
classical models o f decision making.
The level o f irreversibility o f the decision
The accountability structure surrounding the decision
Resource constraints

Figure 5. Contingency Decision Model.
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M ethods

After careful consideration o f the complex decision-making process in local
government, a qualitative case study methodology emerged as the most reliable
method to investigate the privatization decision. This method permitted extensive
data collection and the opportunity to use multiple sources o f information (i.e.,
interviews, news articles, memos, interorganizational documents) (Guba, 1978; Yin,
1994). O’Sullivan and Rassel (2003) say that case studies are often used “to gain an
in-depth understanding o f a process, event” and are a “valid approach to inform
decision-making and enhance understanding.” An in-depth multiple-case study o f
city policy making can provide a basis o f comparison to similar cities that would not
otherwise be available (O ’Sullivan & Rassel, 2003).
The case study methodology is recommended as an approach to studying
problems in which the people and process are interrelated (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Majchrzak (1984) added that case studies “provide for a more in-depth analysis and
a more complete understanding o f a situation’s complexity by examining behavior in
context.” The multiple-case study approach was selected for this research because it
will lead to an improved understanding o f the privatization decision (Stake, 1994).
The multi-site case study offers a means o f investigating complex organizational
units consisting o f multiple variables o f potential importance in understanding the
phenomenon to be studied and results in a rich and reliable account o f the
phenomena. This research used in-depth interviews at the various sites in order to
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obtain much o f the information found in this study. Secondary data were used to
provide leads and to verify the data collected during the interview process.
This research used a descriptive multi-case study format. The purpose for
conducting a multi-case study is that the more cases included in the study and the
greater variation across the cases, the more compelling an interpretation o f a
phenomenon. There are several aspects o f a descriptive case study listed by Tellis
(1997). The descriptive case study approach allows the researcher to investigate the
complexities o f a situation acknowledging the fact that not one but many factors
may contribute to the phenomena. It allows the researcher to have the advantage o f
hindsight, yet find factors that are relevant in the present. The descriptive case study
often shows the influences o f personalities on the issue and the influence o f the
organizational environment.
Yin (1994), among others, maintains that testing causal relations is limited if
there are too few observations. To resolve this research issue, Yin suggests
increasing cases and looking for conclusions that can be explained with a high
degree o f plausibility instead o f looking for an absolute explanation o f a
phenomenon.
To build empirical support for this research, a multiple-case study design
with six cities was chosen for this study. This approach is similar to recent research
in the area o f decision making. Thomas Gustafson (1999), in his study o f “The
Process o f Privatizing Public Golf Courses,” used a multiple-case study design to
study three cities that privatized golf services. Brad Ferko (2004), in studying the
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political decision-making processes in school districts, used a multi-case study to
analyze four school districts in Western Pennsylvania. Ferko also used a classical
decision-making framework as the basis o f his research, citing David Easton (1965a,
1965b) and Griffiths (1967) as a framework o f his research design.
Another concern with qualitative case studies is the ability to generalize the
findings to similar situations. Yin (1994) argues that “case studies, like experiments,
are generalizable to theoretical propositions, not to populations or universes.” Case
studies are not randomly drawn from a known population, as is the case with
surveys, but from a theoretical approach. In case studies, therefore, no
generalization is possible. This is not so much caused by the small number o f cases,
but by the method o f selection.

Description o f Multi-Stage Sample Selection Process

Six comparable medium-sized Michigan cities were selected as case studies
to map the dynamics o f the local government decision-making process. To maximize
validity and eliminate some extraneous variables, the sample cities were similar in
population and form of government and region. Four criteria were established to
guide the identification o f the cities used in this research:
1.

Cities in this study must have participated in an ICMA privatization study

between the years 1997-2002. This criterion allowed for a purposeful selection o f
cities from a random sample that had been involved in the decision to privatize.
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2. In order to limit travel and variability, the sample was limited to cities
located in Michigan. Applying this demographic limitation reduced the total number
o f remaining cities to 72 that met both the ICMA survey and state criteria.
3. The population range was limited to between 10,000 and 60,000 people
for consistency in staffing levels and to focus on cities with a council-manager form
o f government. Cities with less than 10,000 are less likely to have sufficient staff to
engage in a full analysis o f issues and solutions prior to making a decision, thereby
limiting the full range o f decision models that would apply. Conversely, cities with
populations greater than 60,000 would typically have staffing and resources that are
not comparable to those in the target sample. In addition, the ICMA survey data
were incomplete for cities with populations less than 10,000.
4. Cities selected must have a council-manager form o f government. Table 1
shows that, from a total number o f 553 Michigan cities, 440 communities have
populations less than 10,000. The majority o f these communities are villages and do
not have a council-manager form o f government. Only 21 cities in Michigan have
populations greater than 60,000, and many o f these cities have a strong mayor form
o f government and are not comparable to other cities included in this research.
From the list o f cities meeting these four criteria, it was determined that six
was the maximum number o f cities that would allow for in-depth on-site research.
To allow for additional comparison from within the target population, a stratified
sample was created by selecting two cites from each o f the following population
ranges: 10,000-20,000, 20,001-40,000, and 40,001-60,000. The population ranges
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Table 1
Stratified Sample Selection by Michigan City Population
Michigan City
Population
by Range

Number o f
Cities

Cities in 1997-2002
ICMA Studies

Cities in Decision
Research

440*

14

0

10,000-20,000

40

24

2

20,001-40,000

22

19

2

40,001-60,000

11

5

2

> 60,000

21**

10

0

72

6

<10,000

N=

553

* M ost communities with populations less than 10,000 in Michigan are villages and
are not comparable in governmental structure to the cities in this research.
** Nine o f the 21 cities with populations greater than 60,000 have a strong mayor
form o f government and are not comparable to the cities included in this research.

are based upon U.S. census data ranges established for the reporting o f local
government subdivisions in metropolitan or urban regions (U.S. Census Bureau,
2000) and the ICMA survey data (1997, 2002). Each o f the selected cities took part
in a random sample o f cities that responded to an ICMA privatization survey
(ICMA, 1997, 2002). The ICMA surveys were mailed to all cities with populations
over 10,000 and to all counties with populations over 25,000. Merriam (1988)
suggests non-probabilistic sampling for this type o f study, a common form being
purposive or purposeful sampling. This is based on the premise that a researcher
desires to gain as much knowledge as possible about the phenomenon and, thus,
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should select a sample that allows the greatest understanding o f the phenomenon
(Miller, 1991; Yin 1994). The purposeful selection in this study provided a means of
choosing from a larger random sample o f Michigan cities known to have privatized
or considered privatizing public services.

Instrumentation

After identifying and selecting cities to include in the study, background
research was conducted on each city to determine what types o f privatization had
been considered and to identify the individuals and departments both inside and
outside the government who were involved in the decision process.
A search o f secondary information sought to identify the issues, key
participants, and the political environment at the time o f the decision. The secondary
data obtained were also used as the basis for deeper questioning o f the decision
makers in the interview process. The secondary data sources varied from case to
case, but at a minimum consisted o f a review o f local news reports, board meeting
minutes, contracts, agreements, resolutions and ordinances surrounding the time of
the decision.
Semistructured interviews were the primary source o f data in this research.
In-depth interview questions were developed based upon a review o f both decision
making and privatization literature. The leading interview questions were
purposefully open and directed toward developing open conversation. A general list
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o f the coded survey questions is included in Appendix B o f this research. Only those
questions that were relevant to the respondent were asked.
According to Merriam, “the decision to use interviewing as one’s primary
mode o f data collection should be based on the kind o f information being sought and
whether interviewing is the best way to get it” (1988, p. 72). In this case, a
quantitative research study would not provide the detailed information sought and
could lead to invalid conclusions since many public executives lead busy lives and
quantitative surveys tend to be completed by staff. O’Sullivan and Rassel (2003)
speak to this very issue in their article, “Research Methods for Public
Administrators.” In this article they point out that it is difficult for managers to
respond adequately to the vast number o f questionnaires that are sent to city
managers and public officials by students and faculty doing academic research
(O'Sullivan & Rassel, 2003, p. 176). Adding to this problem, many public officials
are burdened with responding to bureaucratic, media, and public requests for
information. As a result, administrative staff, not key decision makers, often hastily
complete mailed questionnaires calling into question the validity o f findings based
upon this method. This research utilizes face-to-face semistructured interviews,
thereby strengthening both reliability and validity o f the research findings.
The primary focus for the interview process is on the key decision makers as
identified in the research design. The stakeholders in the interviews were known
participants in the decision-making process. The interview data are based upon the
responses o f 48 in-depth, one-on-one interviews conducted over a period o f 5

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

months with the key stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. Included
in this group were municipal managers, board members, mayors, and department
heads. In three cases, interviews were conducted with key public officials who were
no longer with the city.
The first stakeholder group chosen to be interviewed was municipal
managers. As chief administrative officer, the municipal manager is charged with
overall managerial responsibility for citywide planning, budgeting, and
implementation o f local government services and plays a key role in the decision
making process. Municipal managers generally serve at the pleasure o f elected
officials and are held accountable for a wide range o f decisions affecting the affairs
o f the municipality. These key public officials are privy to an insider’s information
concerning the problems leading to the decision to privatize.
The second group o f stakeholders chosen as a part o f the interview process
was the municipal board members. These individuals serve as local government
officials charged with city policy making and overseeing programs and expenditures.
Depending on the locality, board members are either elected directly by voters or
appointed by the mayor. Final public policy decisions, such as whether or not to
privatize a public service, generally are made by these board members. Individual
decisions become group decisions at the conclusion o f public debate and the vote.
Mayors were included in the third stakeholder group interviewed. Mayors,
while a functioning part o f the municipal board, have a few important distinctions.
Depending on the form o f government, these elected officials generally serve as the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
chief executive officer presiding over municipal councils or commissions. Mayors
are charged with setting the public agenda and overseeing programs and
expenditures. Under a strong mayor form o f government, the mayor may act as the
chief administrative officer and the chief executive officer. As the highest-ranking
member o f any municipal council, mayors were a key respondent group. It is
generally assumed that their attitudes and experiences with the issues under study
will tend to reflect the views and interests o f the community-at-large. As elected
officials, mayors reflect a political perspective that may not be seen in the municipal
manager’s responses.
The fourth stakeholder group to be interviewed was the administrative staff
and department heads. The titles o f these individuals vary depending on the
municipality but may include such titles as city clerk, treasurer, finance director,
director o f public works. These internal stakeholders generally serve at the pleasure
o f either the mayor or city manager depending on the form o f government. These
stakeholders are key to a complete understanding o f the decision-making process
used in the municipality. The administrative staff is generally charged with providing
the data or information upon which most decisions are made. Much can be learned
from these individuals as to the way decisions are made and by whom.
Upon conclusion o f the in-depth interviews with the above key stakeholders,
and any others identified during the process, the data were analyzed, coded and
compared with secondary data in order to verify its validity and reliability.
Secondary municipal information, such as internal memos, presentations, and
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studies, were requested for analysis. The type and significance o f these materials
varied widely depending on the stakeholder’s roll in the decision-making process
and position in the organization. This approach has the advantage o f triangulation
which compares different data on the same issue. Faulty understandings, which
might elude any single measure, will become apparent in the contrast o f divergent
vantage points (Dooley, 1995).

Data Analysis

Each o f the questions was placed in a coding category. There were many
questions, however, that fit in one or more groups or models. Responses to those
questions were coded and grouped accordingly in the analysis.
Data were analyzed and coded simultaneously with data collection. This
allowed the researcher to “focus and shape the study” as it proceeded (Glesne &
Peshkin, 1992). The analysis o f data focused on the theories elaborated and the six
facets o f the local government decision-making process. The analysis identified
patterns and relationships among the responses o f the key stakeholders and the
secondary information collected and the indicators o f the four decision models.
In examining problems related to the decision to privatize, the analysis
focused on both the individual and organizational perspectives that triggered the
decision process. The analysis also examined who proposed the solution, why they
might have suggested the solution, and what type and level o f advocacy went into its
suggestion. Participants were analyzed in light o f their respective position inside or
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outside the municipal organization, their relative power, values, attitudes and
previous experience with privatization.
The analysis in this research focuses on how well four models o f decision
making (see Figures 2-5) explain decision making in local government. The analysis
compares the central tenets and assumptions o f each model against the data
collected in in-depth one-on-one interviews with key decision makers. Yin (1994)
recommended the use o f case study protocol as part o f a carefully designed research
project. Central to Yin’s protocol was the development o f a plan for interpreting
research findings. This research project planned for collecting and interpreting the
research findings as an integral part o f the research methodology.
The survey instrument (see Appendix B) consisted o f a series o f interview
questions designed to solicit maximum information concerning the nature o f the
decision processes in each o f the cities studied. Interview question were based on a
classical decision-making model. Survey questions were grouped into five
categories: problem identification, solutions or alternatives considered, mechanisms
or processes, key participants, and environment. Each question was coded according
to the category established prior to data collection to allow for the parsing o f data
by major category and by question. Each respondent in this study was asked the
same series o f questions for consistency in the data obtained. Follow-up questions
were used to clarify responses to the survey questions.
Primary data were obtained from taped interviews which were transcribed
verbatim. The interview responses were coded according to the respective category
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o f the questions asked and answered. Following the completion o f all interviews in a
particular city, interview data from individual respondents were color coded by
respondent and combined by category for analysis. The combined data were
analyzed using content and pattern analysis by identifying and linking key words and
concepts that matched with those o f the central indicators o f the four models under
consideration in this study. Campbell (1975) described pattern matching as a useful
technique for linking several pieces o f information from a case to a theory. In this
research, interviews with key decision makers in each city were analyzed using
pattern matching techniques to determine which decision-making model best fit the
data collected. The content analysis took into consideration patterns that emerged
from respondents individually and collectively by city. Attention was given in the
content analysis to variables that would have the potential to influence the adoption
o f a particular process or solution as indicated in the central tenets and assumptions
o f the decision-making models.
The following description provides an example o f how the pattern matching
process was used in this research.
Interview questions in the section titled “Environment” were designed to
solicit information concerning internal and external factors influencing the decision
process (see Appendix B). Respondents’ answers were grouped by question to aid
in the identification o f patterns in responses that corresponded with the decision
models. When a board member was identified in the response, names have been
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withheld and board member X inserted to protect the identities o f the respondents.
When a group was identified, special interest group has been inserted.
Environment question E-2 asked, “Did the advocate for (or against)
privatization stand to benefit in any way from the decision?”
The following are excerpts from city F respondent data in answer to question
E-2:
Board Member 1: Board member X benefited. Board member X had a vested
interest. . . He was running for a second term at this time and he was
tight in with these folks from the special interest group because they
felt they should be given priority so board member X took their side
and basically became their champion as this thing moved along . . .
Board Member 2: The person who supported the special interest group was
running for office. Then they tried to get another person in. I talked
to this person and asked if they knew this group and they said “no.”
But then there was an editorial in the paper by this group saying not
to vote for the other candidate. The special interest group was
paying for the (board member’s) brochure. I was broken and beaten
by this group in the first three years o f my term being on the ad hoc
committee. .. . The mayor made a costly mistake putting an ad hoc
committee together.
Board Member 3: It became a campaign issue as well. I ’m sure you’ve heard
about this special interest group all o f a sudden putting up signs
saying “special interest group supports board member X ’ and they
went out door to d o o r. . . they formed a political action commission
just to get the job.
In this case, the preponderance o f answers indicated that one or two board
members significantly benefited from advocating against privatization. The primary
benefit was gain in political power and successful reelection. These descriptive
responses individually and combined are clear indicators o f several o f the central
tenets and assumptions o f the public choice model (Figure 4). For example, central
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tenet four states that politicians maximize votes, power, authority and resources
based rather than a disinterested pursuit o f public interest. Central tenet five states
that special interest groups seek to maximize their influence. Both o f these central
tenets o f the public choice model are indicated by the patterns o f responses o f the
three board members.
Several o f the public choice theory indicators are also seen in the content o f
the respondents’ data. Public choice indicator six states that elections may trigger
the need to influence either voters or politicians. Public choice indicator seven states
that individuals come together in politics for their own mutual benefit. Public choice
indicator eight states that politicians formulate their policies to win elections. All
three o f these indicators are in evidence in the interview responses.
Following the analysis o f individual and combined interview responses, each
interview was analyzed for consistency with secondary data sources. Secondary data
consisted o f meeting minutes, news articles and public records specifically related to
the decision cases being studied. Findings in this research are a result o f the analysis
o f both the primary and secondary data.

Research Limitations

This research and findings are limited to the population being studied.
Speculation after collecting and interpreting the data about the implications for
wider segments o f the population is reviewed in the concluding chapter o f this
study.
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It should be noted that the restriction o f this research to medium-sized cities
in the state o f Michigan inevitably introduces a tradeoff between validity and
generalizability o f results. I would argue that this choice enables a more valid study
by keeping constant a number o f variables that are difficult to measure in cross-state
studies, most notably the form o f government. Only about one half o f the cities in
the United States have a city manager form o f government. This variable is central
to this research and its absence would alter the applicability to another form o f local
government. At the same time, these results are most generalizable to medium-sized
cities, with a council-manager form o f government in states that share many o f the
characteristics o f the state o f Michigan.
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CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS
The case study findings presented in this chapter are primarily based upon
the responses o f interviews conducted with the key stakeholders involved in the
decision-making process. Included in this group were mayors, board members, local
government managers, and department heads. Each interview was analyzed for
consistency and triangulated with secondary data sources. Secondary data consisted
o f meeting minutes, news articles, and public records specifically related to the
decision cases being studied. From these responses and the secondary information, a
broad picture emerged as to their respective decision-making processes. Macro
analysis with pattern matching was used to determine the correlation with the central
tenets and assumptions o f the models o f decision making (see Figures 2-5 in
Chapter III) to determine which o f the models best fit the respective cases.

The Case Studies

The case studies described in this section are based on decisions made by
public officials in their consideration o f whether or not to privatize public services.
The case analysis will first provide a history and summary o f their respective
decisions as well as descriptions o f how the agency structured the process o f
deciding whether to privatize public services. Specific attention is paid to interview

44

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45
responses describing what triggered the decision process, how decisions are made,
and how the decisions are associated with the decision-making models.
To facilitate the coding and analysis o f the data, each respondent was asked
a series o f questions based on a classical decision-making process. The interview
questions were grouped into six foundational elements from which to analyze the
privatization decision: (1) identification o f the problem(s) that triggered the decision
to consider privatization; (2) the solutions or alternatives considered; (3) the
processes or mechanisms used to make the decision; (4) the environment in which
the decision was made; (5) the identification o f the key participants, their role in the
decision-making process, and what effect they had on the decision; and (6) the
evaluation o f the decision to privatize From these foundational elements, the
research identified the most dominant o f four decision-making models: the rational
model, the bounded rational model, the public choice model, and the contingency
model.

City A

City A Case History
The issue in this case involved a decision to reverse the privatization o f a
segment o f solid waste services. From the public announcement o f this decision, it
appeared that the city simply decided to add a new service segment to their public
works division. While the decision may have been made quickly, the political
process and environment in which it was made was anything but routine. Interview
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data and city minutes describe a multifaceted decision that evolved during the
decisional process.
Each year the city board holds special meetings to discuss the city manager’s
proposed annual budget. In this meeting, the problem initially appeared to be
excessive budgetary expenditures and the level o f services in relation to the tax
millage. The problem that was specifically identified was whether the city should
take over a service that was currently being provided under contract with a private
company. Interestingly, the problem in this case and its solution were identified at
the same meeting as the final vote on the decision. There was little discussion o f the
issue and the vote was unanimous. Also o f interest is the fact that there was no
research presented as to the cost implications at the time o f the decision or prior to
its being announced to the public the next day.
It appears that one or more board members had an ongoing agenda to
increase the level o f existing municipal services. They also sought to change who
produced that service by moving the service in house as a municipally run operation.
A request for expansion o f this service had been presented in the past, but had been
rejected by previous administrations. The current city manager, being relatively new
to the position, was unaware o f this history when he and the board came to terms on
funding this service.
It is important that the length o f tenure for senior staff in City A is not
comparable to other cities o f similar size. Respondents attribute the abridged tenure
to an ongoing hostile organizational environment. The most observable consequence
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to the decision process is the limitation o f options presented to the board for their
consideration. Only those solutions that were perceived as acceptable to powerful
board members were presented. Length o f tenure is symptomatic o f a deeper
problem that is seriously affecting the decisional process. This root problem and its
affect on decision making will be examined in detail below.

City A Analysis
Problem Identification
To better understand the logic o f the board’s decision, it was necessary to
compare interview data with records o f the board meetings on this issue. The
following is a summary and analysis o f the process leading up to the identification o f
the problem and the introduction o f the solution by one o f the board members.
During the city’s first budget workshop, a few o f the board members
strongly expressed that they would like the proposed budget reduced across the
board. One influential board member also strongly felt that the board should cut
taxes. This member appeared to be the informal leader o f the board. Board meeting
minutes show that this individual initiated and controlled many o f the board’s
debates. Interview responses indicate that deference was given to his ideas
concerning spending and taxes over others on the board. The informal leader felt
that taxpayers should not be paying more taxes this year than they were the year
before. His argument was that the effective tax rate increased each year due to
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inflation. As a result, the board directed the manager to make across-the-board cuts
prior to their next budget meeting.
In a second budget workshop, the manager presented a revised budget
showing a reduction in total expenses, but left the revenues untouched creating a
surplus o f revenues. The same board members who expressed a desire to cut the
budget then attacked the city manager on the revenue portion o f the budget. The
informal leader o f the board again pushed forward the idea that the board cut the tax
millage but indicated that he was now willing to consider adding another service. He
then proposed a new municipally run service to be added to the public works
division. From a review o f interview data and secondary sources, this position is not
consistent with previous positions held by the informal leader. On previous
occasions, and in his interview, the informal leader indicated that he had strongly
supported private production o f municipal services, but in this case he argued in
favor o f municipal production o f the service. The informal leader’s position was
consistent with the public choice indicator that says that decision makers select
alternatives that maximize personal benefits. Previously, the informal leader entered
into a contract with the city privatizing a city service. Board meeting minutes show
that when a privatization decision benefited him personally as part owner o f the
contracting company, he voted in favor o f privatization. When it favored picking up
votes by increasing public services to constituents, he voted to bring the service inhouse. Interview data indicate that it was the informal leader’s belief that the
increased public service in this case would improve his position with voters.
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The above budget discussions have a number o f decision-making indicators
that are found as indicators in the public choice model. Public choice decision
makers must provide increasing rewards to keep improving absolute and relative
positions with voters. The introduction o f an additional service is a key public
choice indicator in that it was a way to maximize the budget and as a way to
maximize votes. The informal leader’s inconsistent position also indicated that this
was simply a political decision formulated to win an election.
Consistent with the public choice model, the board made a hasty intuitive
decision that directly benefited the decision makers. Following the lead o f the
informal leader, the board voted unanimously in support o f his idea. Respondent
interview data indicate that they were interested in either enhancing their position
with voters or moving the budget process forward. For example, the mayor, seeing
an opportunity to get consensus on the budget and to stop the attacks on the
manager, quickly consented to the proposed idea. The city manager, being opposed
to reducing taxes and tired o f the budget debate, also consented to the informal
leader’s new proposal.
It is of interest that the solution was accepted without evaluation o f cost or
alternatives. An indicator o f the public choice theory is that there is little cost/benefit
analysis or it is not a primary factor in the decision-making process. In this case,
they made the final decision without any analytical support. This was very much a
political decision, the benefits or success o f which were weighed by nonquantitative
measures. The failure to consider meaningful alternatives is also an indicator o f the
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public choice model. The facts o f this case do not support any attempt by the board
to decide in a bounded rational manner.
When examining problems in preparation to making a decision, it is o f
importance that one identify the causal factors o f a problem rather than the
symptoms o f a deeper underlying issue (Starling, 2005). On the surface, the issue in
this case initially appeared to be concern about total budgetary expenditures. The
real problem, however, was much more complex. It appears that the key underlying
problem was that the city manager did not present a budget with a service that had
been requested by the informal leader. In the interview with the informal leader, he
stated that “the manager proposed a budget to us and he still didn’t put the service
increase in it, so we rejected it.” Research could identify only two o f the board
members with knowledge o f this request prior to the budget meeting. Both o f these
members stood to benefit by the decision as both were actively running for
reelection. Consistent with the public choice model, they were, by their own
admission, seeking to advance this policy to improve their position with voters. City
residents would see an increase to city services without an apparent increase in the
city tax rate. The question is whether this was a disinterested pursuit o f public policy
or the advancement o f the role o f government in the interests o f the decision
makers.
The data in this case indicate that the decision was planned to maximize
personal benefit to the advocating board members. The primary advocates for this
service change were representing constituents that were disabled and/or senior
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citizens. They were also members o f this population that stood to benefit
significantly from this service change. In this case the policy advocates seemed
indifferent as to how the service would be provided as long as they obtained the
service change. This could be interpreted as bounded rational “satisficing,” but the
respondents indicated that this was a planned political move calculated to happen
just before the election. M ore specifically, tw o separate respondents indicated that
the budget debate was planned to force a decision to add another municipal service
prior to the next election.
Given these facts, the public choice model is a very close fit for the
decisional process and outcomes o f this case. While participants who made the
decision benefited as citizens from the increased city services, the two board
members advocating for the service stood to benefit personally in the upcoming
election.

Solutions and Alternatives
This case deviates from the decision-making process generally followed by
City A o f finding alternatives or solutions to a problem. The formal decision process
typically used by City A followed closely the bounded rational model o f decision
making. This was affirmed by interview questions that queried how decisions were
usually made in the city. In a typical decision process, the board or the manager
identifies the problem. If there is consensus that a solution is required, the board
then directs the city manager to research the issue and provide a range o f
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alternatives to solve the problem. It was also assumed that the manager would
provide an analysis o f each o f the alternatives identifying probable outcomes for
each. In this case, a very aggressive board member seeking a service change created
an environment that resulted in a shift in the board’s normal decision-making
process. This shift in approach is indicative o f the contingency model o f decision
making.
Decision makers operating from a bounded rational perspective o f decision
making would have asked for more time to research the problem or situation and
seek information on alternatives. Instead o f taking time to evaluate the proposed
solution, it was immediately adopted, and none o f the respondents knew the
estimated costs o f the new program at the time o f the decision. In asking if they felt
like they had all the information that they needed, nearly all said that they wished
that they would have had more information. These facts would be indicative o f a
bounded rational approach, but for the fact that they also knew that “another
political fight would look bad for them in the newspapers.” The rational model o f
decision making would have sought to maximize effectiveness per expenditure. In
this case the political reasoning for the decision dominated and costs were ignored.
Was this the only solution possible? No, there were a number o f alternatives
that were available to the city, one o f which was keeping the service in the private
sector. In discussing the issue with city staff, it was discovered that the city had just
renegotiated a contract for this service just prior to the budgetary discussions. As a
part o f the negotiations, the contractor gave the city a quote to expand on the
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current service level to include the proposed service. Follow-up questions
concerning why the city did not consider this alternative indicated that the primary
advocate for the service thought the city should provide “all the services.” This was
inconsistent with his previous position concerning the privatization o f another
service. It is consistent, however, with the public choice indicator that says that
politicians formulate their positions to win elections and that individual preferences
become more important than that o f the community.
Was this a good decision? Nearly all o f the board felt that this was a good
decision. The mayor thought that it was a “win-win decision.” He said that “it
dissipated the destructive stuff that was going on; three board members were
beating up our city manager.” It appears that the win must have been a win for the
board members running for reelection and a win for the manager who survived to
fight another day.
N ot everyone thought that it was a win, however. Nearly all o f the city staff
involved were directly or indirectly opposed to this decision. Even those who stood
to benefit through budgetary increases in their department thought that it was a bad
idea. One o f the department heads noted that “they already had a contractor doing a
good job at providing this service. Eighty percent o f the city was taking advantage
o f the service and, if necessary, the city would assist.” In addition to this argument,
the finance staff noted that the cost would exceed what was roughly estimated in the
board meeting.
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Looking at this decision from the staff perspective also seems to support the
idea that this political decision was made from a public choice perspective. An
additional factor identified in this section was the amount o f pressure placed on a
relatively new manager to achieve the political goal desired. This, too, is a public
choice indicator in that the decision increased political power and control for the
informal leader.

Decision-Making Process
In analyzing the data in this case, it quickly became clear that there was a
formal and informal decision-making process in the city. All o f the respondents in
this case confirm that the city’s formal decision-making process followed the
traditional functions o f a council-manager form o f government. The mayor, as a
member o f the board, has the ability to vote and is the tie-breaking vote if necessary,
but the ultimate authority to make public policy decisions resides in the local elected
board upon the recommendation o f the city manager. The city charter gives the
responsibility for all day-to-day operational decisions to the city manager.
In describing the typical decision-making process, the mayor explained that if
a board member had an idea, they would present it to the city manager for research
and inclusion on the agenda. “One o f us on the board would ask the manager for the
pros and cons so we have both sides o f the issue.” A simple listing o f the positive
and negative aspects o f an issue is a narrow way to examine a problem. If this
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becomes the basis o f a decision, that narrow analysis is indicative o f a bounded
rational decision approach.
The mayor went on to say that they stress with the manager not to take sides
on an issue. This admonishment is rooted in the theory that managers should be
impersonal administrators neutral in their assessment o f policy issues (Dye, 2002).
This process is descriptive o f a rational decision process where an administrator is
expected to gather information and provide a number o f alternatives from which the
board can choose.
Interview data show, however, that not all o f the policy problems in this city
followed this process. The mayor described two types o f decisional processes. The
first was for regular decisions and the second was for “hot button” issues. The
process used to deal with what was described as “hot button” issues deviates from
the city’s formal decision-making process only slightly. In this process the mayor
met with board members one on one to get a feel for where they stood on an issue
prior to a public meeting. He also said that he wanted to find out if there were
“things that they didn’t understand before they bring up negative things at a board
meeting that really don't need to be brought up.”
While this process is not specifically identified in most decision-making
models, it is a definite part o f the process o f narrowing alternatives and possible
solutions to a problem. From my experience this secondary process is very typical o f
governmental decision making. The end effect o f this process is to limit the
alternatives or solutions that are brought before the public. In essence, it precludes
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public debate on issues that are not on the agenda. This narrowing o f the agenda or
alternatives is consistent with the bounded rational decision approach— the city’s
typical decision-making process. Depending on the decision maker’s motive,
however, this may be indicative o f the public choice model in that politicians will
tend to reject meaningful alternatives in favor o f supporting positions that favor their
own interests.
All o f the cities that are a part o f this study use this process to some extent
to build consensus on issues prior to a vote. Consensus building for the purpose o f
narrowing proposed solutions is indicative o f a bounded rational decision approach.
The mayor or the city manager generally handles the polling o f the board members.
However, in this case one influential board member was vehemently opposed to
discussing issues individually with the city manager. He stated that he didn’t like
managers coming around and talking to him individually. It was his feeling that the
manager should communicate with the board all at the same time. He went on to say
that this was part o f the reason that one o f their managers was fired.

Decision-Making Environment
City A has a history o f a hostile political environment documented by both
primary and secondary data. That hostility had a chilling effect on individuals who
desire to serve long-term in the city organization. One board member said, “After
you get elected, you are disliked. This is a very political town.” The board member
went on to note that every two years that there was a complete turnover in the
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board. The mayor added a different perspective noting that the city has “a reputation
for electing people who have an axe to grind, a single issue, that’s the only reason
people run for council.” The mayor expressed a concern that these members were
having a serious effect on employee morale and tenure o f service. One respondent
indicated that in three years the city had “turned over all but three department heads,
or up, positions. That is seven people that have left in three years.” This being the
case for a number o f years, it was no surprise that length o f tenure for senior staff
was considerably shorter that in cities o f similar size.
The existence o f this caustic environment, while not unique to this city, has
persisted long enough to destroy open and normal communications between the
board and city staff. In part, the negative environment found in this case can be
directly attributed to the failure or refusal to communicate. One serious consequence
o f the communications breakdown was an escalating level o f mistrust and
antagonism between the board and the city staff. Both primary and secondary data
showed that members o f the board regarded recommendations o f the city manager
and staffer with skepticism and often publicly challenged them. Another effect was a
severe criticism o f the managers’ ability to communicate by members o f the board.
Determining which came first— the failure to communicate or the hostile
environment— is beyond the scope this study. It could be inferred that, based on the
tenure o f senior staff, it was a preexisting condition. In regard to the decision in this
case, it is important to show that the city manager’s communication ability was a
problem. This board member stated that the manager was in “more trouble than he
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realizes.” He went on to say that “if we had not just canned the last manager, he
would have been gone before now.” The latter statement is included so that there is
a full appreciation o f the environment in which decision was being made. Again it is
important to note that while this may not be typical o f most local governments, it is
reasonable to believe that it is representative o f those with highly political decisional
processes.
Approval o f a recommendation often required the support o f this one
dominant decision maker on the board. This dominance is patterned after a leaderfollower leadership style (Starling, 2005) and is difficult to overcome. Even though
this member is only one o f a group o f key decision makers, others look up to him. In
fact, the mayor gave him the title o f “town acumen.” I f a recommendation was
presented that was contrary to the recommendation o f the “town acumen,’’approval
was difficult. Hence, the typical process o f building consensus was not possible. As
a result, the decisional process became highly political and driven primarily by
personal agendas, an indicator o f the public choice model. As is indicated in the
contingency model o f decision making, environmental conditions, such as an
unstable organizational or political environment, can lead to the adoption o f an
alternative decision process. Under normal circumstances this board operates within
the parameters o f the bounded rational model, but, in this case, the board shifted to
the more political public choice decision-making process in reaction to the situation.
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Implementation and Evaluation o f Decisions
Before and during the decision-making process, there was little information
explaining how the decision would be implemented and none on how it would be
evaluated. Even the primary advocate for the service shifted the responsibility to the
manager. Recounting the decision,he said that “the manager came back in our
second meeting with a line item in the budget that would include the service. That is
as deep as we got into it, so I don't know what he is going to provide.” This
statement says volumes in regard to the real goal o f the service. One would think
that if this service were really needed, the board would have had some idea o f how it
would be implemented. The fact is that, at the time o f these interviews, none o f the
respondents, including the manager, had a real idea o f how this service was going to
be implemented. This is consistent with a public choice model in that the real
political objective would be realized upon its announcement to the public. The
morning following the decision to create this “new service,” the proposing members
made the announcement to the newspaper.
As to the evaluation o f this decision, the respondents overwhelming
indicated that there is not a formal process for evaluation o f decisions. A common
response to this line o f questions was that if it does not work, we will fix it later.
This statement indicates a willingness by the board to make incremental changes in
policy to fit the political environment. This situational response corresponds both to
their normal bounded rational decision approach and the public choice model. The
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distinctive difference is that the controlling decision makers’ intent was to achieve
personal benefit, consistent with the public choice model.
In discussing the evaluation process, board members indicated that if there
were a problem, “they would hear about it.” This presumes that after the board
heard about a problem, they would fix it. This reactive decision making is again
consistent with the public choice model. This model tends to place a higher value on
perceived levels o f satisfaction and reactive actions as opposed to more proactive
rational quantitative approaches.

Conclusions
This case has elements o f the contingency model. Under this model the
decision makers adapted to a hostile decision-making environment at the time o f the
decision. The city’s typical bounded rational decision-making process was replaced
by a public choice process. The key stakeholders in this case acted in their own self
interest. The cost o f the decision was a minor factor in the decision since it was not
seriously evaluated. There was an amount that was set aside for the service change,
but no one knew whether the service could be provided for that amount.
Examining the entirety o f the interview data, this decision seemed to be a
very shrewd political strategy. What began as an analytical discussion o f the budget,
or a rational decisional process, evolved into a very political process most closely
aligned with the public choice model— political, not in a positive democratic sense,
but political in the sense o f self-empowerment and self-interest. This led to a forced
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decision made in an antagonistic decisional environment. None o f the decision
makers, when questioned about the decision, said that it was a rational decision.
Some said that it was a good decision, but none said that it was made well. In the
end, this decision benefited most those who proposed it. The informal leader o f the
board looked to use it in a reelection bid. It might be added that the mayor and the
manager both benefited, one by saving face and the other by getting a budget
passed. In light of these findings, it is apparent that this board’s decisional process is
the embodiment o f the public choice model.

City B

City B Case History
This case involves the decision to privatize meter reading for all city water
and sewer customers. M eter reading had historically been a service performed by
city Department o f Public Works (DPW) employees. At the time o f the decision to
privatize this service, all o f the DPW employees were members o f a local bargaining
unit.
The apparent problem in this case, as expressed by the majority o f the
respondents, was an inefficient and ineffective use o f employees. While there is a
general concurrence as to the apparent problem, only one respondent identified the
root problem. In this case, the board’s decision resolved the apparent problem, not
the underlying root problem.
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The finance department’s utility billing software required that the meters be
read once a month and that the data be transmitted by the end o f the first week o f
each month. The DPW did not place the same priority on the reading and data
transfer and readings were often completed well beyond the requisite time for data
entry. Each time the data were transferred late, the billing and penalty cycle was
seriously disrupted. Customers complained to the finance department and the utility
employees complained to the finance director. This ongoing problem created
considerable conflict both inside and outside o f the organization. When presented
with the problem, the director o f public works cited the many pressing priorities that
competed for their time. By way o f example, the director cited that in the winter,
DPW employees at times had to be redirected from the much more important duty
o f snow plowing to do meter reading.
The interview data indicate that the city manager’s office had long ignored
this problem. Department managers did not agree as to the real problem. This
bifurcation o f opinion cuts to the heart o f the real problem. It also lays the
foundation for the analysis o f how and on what basis the administration and board
made their decision.
The failure o f employees to perform the required service (meter reading) in a
timely way was not seen as ineffective management, but rather the problem with
meter reading in this case was characterized as an “inefficient use o f DPW
employee’s time” by the DPW director. The issue persisted for a number o f years
before the director o f the DPW in frustration presented a solution. But the solution
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was not presented as a solution to ineffective management, but rather, as one board
member expressed it, a way to “become more efficient and improve our service.”
Upon further questioning, it became clear that the performance o f employees was
not the issue they were seeking to resolve. The real issue was that the employees did
not like doing the meter reading because they saw this job as demeaning. Identifying
this fact helped to explain why the union was in total support o f privatizing the
service. It should also be noted that no employees were lost to the privatization and
that no additional work was assigned to the unit.

City B Analysis
Problem Identification
Problem identification in this city is primarily done at the departmental level
and passed on to the manager’s office. On occasion, the board or the manager’s
office will be involved in identifying a problem, but typically they have been willing
for this to happen at the departmental or employee level. O f interest and central to
this case is the fact that employees are very much a part o f the decision-making
process. The problem as originally presented was an issue o f scheduling employees
to do meter readings in a timely manner so as to get those data to the finance
department to process customer billings. The issue in this case was precipitated by
the finance department trying to get a solution to a problem that was occurring on a
monthly basis. This issue had been ongoing for years and only small policy changes
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had been made to address it previously. The city manager was nonresponsive to the
issue and looked to the departments for its resolution.
The willingness o f the board and the city manager to allow problems to
present themselves and to react to them is indicative o f the bounded rational
decision process. City minutes and discussions with city department heads show a
pattern o f reactive problem solving rather than proactive strategic planning. While
most models have some elements o f reactive decision making, the ideal held out by
the rational decision-making process is to plan and organize in such a way as to
anticipate problems. In particular, the city manager seemed unwilling to make longer
term policy decisions unless confronted repeatedly by an issue, again an indicator o f
the bounded rational decision process.
The DPW director in this case saw the problem not as a management
problem but rather an issue o f a “financial nature.” The issue to the DPW director
was one o f staffing and the proper and efficient use o f personnel. The problem was
characterized very differently by the two department heads. To the finance
department, the problem was caused by a lack o f good management and the solution
was to demand performance. Since problems are typically identified from the
department level in this city, it was from the department perspective, specifically the
DPW perspective, that the problem was presented to the city manager and
eventually to the board.
A review o f primary data indicates that the city’s staffing levels as compared
to similar size communities gives no weight to the DPW director’s claim o f
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understaffing. The real problem was that supervisors never assigned employees to
the task for sufficient periods o f time to accomplish the task. From the DPW
department’s perspective, there weren’t enough employees to do the work. Was that
an employee problem or a management issue related to having enough employees to
carry the function out? The DPW department manager was given the opportunity to
characterize the problem, identified it as a staffing problem, and that was how he
presented the problem to the board.
The involvement o f the department manager and employees in the policy and
decision-making process, including setting the agenda and identifying problems, is
an indicator o f the public choice model o f decision making. In the public choice
decision process, problems are identified based on self-interest. Clearly, in this case,
the problem was identified in such a way as to maximize the benefit to the
department manager, protecting his budget and staffing levels, and to the employees.
The employees were able to shift the focus from employee performance to
efficiency. Secondary data in this case, city minutes, indicate that the question o f
efficiency was evaluated in a subjective way. No formal cost benefit analysis was
performed or presented to the board for their review prior to making a decision.
Both the bounded rational and the public choice processes use an intuitive based
process to identify problems as is indicated in the failure to use some form o f an
analytical decision tool.
In addition to the issue o f staffing, the problem was also characterized as an
issue o f employee morale. As one senior staff member noted, it wasn’t a financial
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issue, it was “a problem with the morale o f DPW workers doing what they
considered a menial task.” Another senior staff member said, “I think that the board
recognized that there was more important work to be done. Honestly, it was not the
favorite work that they did. They would rather be running the backhoe, than running
up and down streets facing the dogs.” Even board members stated that they saw this
task as menial and that while employees were reading meters “other more important
work was not being done.” One department manager said that “the issue wasn't
really presented as a problem that needed a solution”; rather “it was a way to do
something better.”
It’s clear from the facts that this was not a controversial political decision.
The board was quite willing to wait for problems to be presented to them, an
indicator o f the bounded rational model, and they “had full confidence in their staff’
to provide them with good recommendations. While the department and the staff
may have been operating from the public choice perspective, it does not appear that
the city board was in any way. In a city where the board was making decisions from
the public choice perspective, issues o f this nature would be exploited for full
political benefit. Employees acted in their self-interest, a public choice indicator,
when they and the union approved the privatization o f the meter reading. The task
had been uniformly disliked by employees and the union was not facing a loss o f
jobs, a win-win situation for the employees. The department head was able to
protect his budget, also a public choice indicator, and remove a task that was seen
as an inefficient use o f the workforce.
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Solutions and Alternatives
In this city, senior staff members identify nearly all solutions or alternatives
to problems. The problem in this case had existed for at least two years prior to the
board’s action. Secondary data, city minutes and memos, indicate that the
administration was aware o f the problem previously and had made slight
adjustments to remedy the problem. This type o f incremental solution is a central
tenet o f the bounded rational approach to decision making and is indicated in this
case.
In this case, the department manager, facing an ongoing problem, indicated
that he had done some research to evaluate the availability and feasibility o f
contracting out this service. Once it was determined that private production o f the
service was available, and the costs were identified, he presented his
recommendation to the manager.
Once the city manager accepted the recommendation to pursue a private
contract, the city manager and the staff were quantitative in their approach to the
problem. The solution that they had chosen was supported with analytical data. The
department manager said that “we looked up the numbers, we made an estimate
about the time, and what it would cost, what the contractor was doing with their
costs and we presented that to the manager and to the council with our
recommendation.”
The facts o f this case parallel several o f the indicators found in the bounded
rational decision-making model, summarized in Figure 3, Chapter III. The board
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members and the manager had been aware o f a problem with the meter reading for
several years. As is indicated, the decision makers waited for the problem to be
presented before they reacted. Once the problem was presented, they chose to
address symptoms rather than dealing with the underlying issue o f performance.
One senior manager said that “cost was not an issue in my consideration;
once we had a solution that seemed to be viable, we would have paid more.” A
focus on cost and benefits is an indicator o f the rational decision process. The failure
to use fiscal and other quantitative measures in the identification o f the problem or
solutions suggest that the rational decision process was not followed in this case.
This solution was selected on the basis o f service to the public and a desire to please
public employees. This is very much a bounded rational approach to the problem
and to the solution. The board and the management team were willing to accept the
first alternative presented that solved the problem, or at least the problem as
identified and presented. The lack o f goal clarity is yet another indicator o f the
bounded rational approach and is inconsistent with the rational decision-making
model. Interviews supported by a review o f secondary data, city minutes, shows that
only one solution or alternative was presented to the board to deal with this issue.
The solution, according to one respondent, was based upon the fact that the
“employees could be used for something more valuable than just taking readings.”
The goal, according to another, was to “come up with a method o f reading the
meters that was the most efficient and cost effective.”
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It was discovered, however, while discussing this decision with the
department director that he had contacted a private company prior to presenting this
issue to the manager. This is o f interest in that this company was one o f two bids on
this service. This will be discussed in more detail in the implementation section
below.
Once the city manager agreed to the solution, the DPW department head
was given the responsibility o f preparing and presenting the problem and the
solution to the board. This process is interesting in that DPW was then able to
present the problem in such a way that it did not reflect poorly on their department.
This self-protection is very characteristic o f the public choice model in that they
r

attempted to maximize the individual gain from the problem identification as well as
in the presentation o f the solution.
It could be argued that department head was trying to maximize his budget,
a central assumption in the public choice model. Also interesting is the public choice
indicator that says that individuals come together in politics for their own mutual
benefit. This is bom out in the union’s support for this privatization decision. The
fact that the employees in the union agreed to the privatization, without dissent, was
uncharacteristic. But the facts o f the case show that the employees were in reality
driving the entire issue and that the solution was a solution that they sought. None
o f the DPW employees liked performing this task, and the responsible department
head was reluctant to assign the duty. Consequently, the task was not being
performed satisfactorily and upper management did not demand performance. Errors
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in data collection, untimely data transfer, and conflicts with priorities were not
presented as the problems to be resolved. Rather, in presenting the issue to the
board, the department head characterized the problem as an inefficient use o f highly
trained and well paid employees. The board unanimously agreed and concurred that
such highly paid and well-trained employees should not be used to perform such a
“menial” task as meter reading.
Was this a snap judgment on the part o f the board or was it a well planned
out analytical decision? It does not appear that either is the case. It simply was the
best choice at the time that presented itself to them. The decision was not an
uninformed decision, but neither was it a strategic decision. The decision was
intuitive and based entirely upon the recommendation o f the department head. It did
solve, at least on a temporary basis, a problem that had been a long-standing issue.
Solving problems with short-term or temporary solutions is a key indicator in the
bounded rational model.
While this was the only solution presented, it was not the only alternative
that would have solved the problem. Another option would have been to hire
another employee whose sole function would have been to read meters. Another
solution would have been to expand the job description o f an employee and assign
the task for specific periods o f time. These solutions, according to one respondent,
were not favorable to the department and as such were avoided. This avoidance o f
conflict is o f interest and will be discussed in both the decision-making process and
decision-making environment section.
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Decision-Making Process
As is the case in the other cities in this study, the formal decision-making
process is typical o f a council-manager form o f government. The board meets twice
a month in regular meetings and twice a month in a workshop format. The
workshop format allows for a less formal decision-making environment and seems
to be effective.
The city manager in this city took a very low key approach toward the
decision-making process. In fact, most o f the decision making in City B starts at the
department head level and is passed up to the city manager’s office for review and
approval for presentation to the board. This places problem and solution
identification in the hands o f the key stakeholders closest to the problem. In most
cases, this would be seen as a more progressive style o f decision making, but in this
case, a part o f the problem was in the management o f the department itself.
As previously mentioned, the process o f information gathering and
presentation is typically done by the director o f a department. He or she brings
concepts or recommendations to the board at a regular meeting. At these meetings,
the board will discuss the issue followed by an up or down vote. There are times
that the board will hold issues over for a workshop or the next regularly scheduled
meeting. The board from time to time also will direct a manager to gather more facts
and figures. Secondary data indicate that this was the exception rather than the rule.
Only one board member asked for more specifics on proposals brought before the
board.
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In addition to the formal process o f decision making, there was a very active
informal process. The mayor met with board members on a regular basis to discuss
city business and on occasion to “run a proposal by them.” This informal process
seems to be a common thread in the local government decision-making process and
is typically used to build consensus on an issue. Consensus building, depending on
whether it’s political or not, could be considered an indicator o f the rational
approach to decision making. This informal decision step is aimed at developing
clear and acceptable goals, which is a central assumption o f the rational decision
approach.
M ost decisions in this city were typically made on an individual basis as
presented, and the data provided were usually quantitative in nature. M ost decisions
were usually not risky decisions and were incremental in nature. One senior staff
member felt that the city manager was overly risk adverse and purposefully avoided
difficult issues. This subjective claim was difficult to verify, but a review o f
secondary information indicates there really have been only one or two major
decisions in the last 10 years that have generated significant public opposition. These
facts tend to support the idea that this decision, and most o f the decisions made in
this city, are from the bounded rational approach.

Decision-Making Environment
The decision-making environment as well as the organizational environment
can best be described as cooperative. The board, management, and the staff
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communicate well and on a regular basis. Board members have the ability to contact
senior managers and employees directly, but rarely do so. The board and
administration actively seek to create an atmosphere o f appreciation o f the
employees and the work that is done. This is evidenced in the secondary data, board
minutes, and memorandums, as public employee recognition is frequent.
The only negative aspect o f the decisional environment was related to the
refusal o f the city manager to deal directly and quickly with issues, which was noted
by respondents and confirmed by secondary data. Board meeting minutes show that
on previous occasions issues brought before the board and assigned to the city
manager tended to be lost or take months or years before coming back to the board
for a decision. This is consistent with the bounded rational decision process that is in
evidence in this city. The city manager’s office tends to control information going to
the board for a decision, and the pace at which the board gets information. But this,
in part, seems to be a mechanism to require that problems be clearly defined,
painfully so, prior to bringing it to the attention to the board. Solutions are also
expected to accompany the introduction o f problems. Secondary data, internal
memos, indicate that senior staff are expected to present both the problem and the
solutions at the same meeting and expect a decision. This decisional process would
seem to be a much abbreviated process, but for the fact that much o f the
communication regarding an issue is dealt with informally.
M ost o f the more difficult decisions take months and sometimes years before
they are formally presented to the board for a final vote. Not that the board is
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unaware of the issues, but simply that the issues are not placed on their agenda for a
formal decision. Records indicate that this issue had been discussed for at least two
years prior to going to the board for a vote.
Finally, another factor that seems to have a positive effect on the decisional
environment is the fiscal health. Fiscally this city was in very good condition at the
time o f this decision. It is reasonable to assume that this adds to the security o f the
decision makers as well as the employees in this case. It is also reasonable to expect
that the decision-making process is made less difficult absent serious fiscal concerns.

Implementation and Evaluation o f Decisions
Implementation was seamless. Once the board approved the privatization o f
this city service, the DPW director prepared a request for proposals seeking bids for
the work. There were only two bids. As previously mentioned, one o f the companies
had previously contacted the department director with an interest in the work. The
city manager indicated that this company was not the lowest bid, but they were
nonetheless given the contract. In accepting bids, the city had reserved the right to
take the lowest and “best” bid. In this case, the lowest bidder, according the city
manager, “was not able to read the meters when we needed to have them read.” As
a footnote o f interest, the company that was given the final bid in this case was also
the company that was used to obtain the informal quotes. It was also discovered
through secondary data, internal memos, and confirmed with the department
manager, that this company had pursued the department seeking this w ork and that
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extensive discussion o f the work had taken place prior to making a recommendation.
Both o f these factors would make a stronger case for the public choice decision
model if these contacts had been with an elected official. None o f these facts
surrounding the formulation o f the department’s recommendation found their way to
the board prior to it decision. Had this information been known ahead o f the vote, it
may have resulted in a different vote. It is not likely that they would have voted not
to privatize, but that they might have accepted another bid.
One o f the indicators o f a bounded rational decision-making process is an
incremental solution Overall, the implementation o f this service was incremental.
The city manager indicated that they started out with a one-year contract to try it.
Provisions for renewal were based upon the re-ratification by the board for another
two years.

Conclusions
There appears to be two decision models that are applicable to this case, but
one that is specific to the final decision process. The facts o f the case indicate that
the department manager and the employees were operating from a public choice
perspective in their approach to the problem identification and solutions presented.
The public choice model assumes that decision makers will identify problems based
on self-interest, will select alternatives and solutions that maximize personal benefits,
and will maximize their budgets. The employees in this case could also be
considered as a special interest group seeking to maximize their influence over the
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policy process in their own favor. While the public choice process appears to have
played a part in the process leading up to the board’s decision, the department head
and the employees are only able to influence the board’s decision and process.
There is no evidence in this case that indicates that the elected officials, in
making the privatization decision, acted from the public choice perspective. In fact,
there is no indication o f self-interest on the part o f the public officials in this case.
To the contrary, most o f the elected decision makers were looking out for the
interests o f either employees or the public. The board’s apparent altruistic behavior
is contrary to the central assumptions o f the public choice model. As to the
employees, it could be said that they had serious vested interest in seeing this
decision made in the way that it was. But, while they are an informal part o f the
decision process, they really are only able to indirectly influence the process. The
public decision makers do, however, value the employees and encourage a decision
making process that is a bottom-up process.
The city manager in this case was risk adverse. I f a decision or issue was
controversial, then it was avoided and the problems persisted. Short-term solutions
or corrections would be made, but permanent solutions or alternatives rarely were
presented. The root problem in this case was not the conflict between the finance
department and the DPW. It was not the conflict o f tasks to be completed by the
DPW. The real underlying problem in this case is the unwillingness o f the managers
to deal with the problem o f employee performance. As one respondent said, the
“real problem was a management issue.” The solution was, however, acceptable to
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all. This is a classical bounded rational response. If it’s acceptable to everyone right
now, then it’s the right decision. All but one respondent agreed that it was not only
the right decision but also the best decision.
In this case, environmental contingencies did not seem to influence the
decision-making approach. None o f the contingency model indicators, such as an
unstable internal or external decision-making environment or weak organizational
leadership, were present in this case. While there may have been some disagreement
among the staff as to the identification o f the problem, there was consensus in the
organizational goal o f providing improved public service.

City C

City C Case History
The decision in this case involved the procurement o f comprehensive solid
waste services. The facts o f this case indicate that the decision resulted in a publicprivate venture. This is, however, a very unusual privatization case in that the
service to be privatized was already being provided by private companies when the
city took up the issue.
Tourism, being one o f the communities’ primary industries, inspired a
campaign to improve the city’s image. One o f the issues frequently discussed was
the problem o f multiple solid waste companies doing business in the city. As a
result, unsightly trash was set out at the curb nearly every day o f the week. In an
attempt to coordinate this service, the city previously passed legislation regulating
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both the residential and commercial solid waste. Regulating the service, however,
had limited success and required a full-time inspector. Having not accomplished its
purpose with these steps, the city decided to bring solid waste collection under the
full authority o f the city. To this end, the city passed legislation creating an exclusive
franchise for solid waste removal. This exclusive franchise gave one company the
right to do solid waste removal in the city. The city was then able to fully regulate
this service and control what had been perceived as a serious problem. The city
retained the customer service and billing portion o f the service. Thus, a publicprivate venture was created.
Quotes from the city manager and a 12-year council member give an
indication o f how significant this proposed privatization was at the time: “I would
have to say this program has probably as much potential o f affecting every property
owner than any other policy w e’ve ever implemented” (City C News Article, 1992).
The issue was o f interest to so many citizens that, according to the city manager,
“the public hearing had to be moved to the civic center, which held 3,500 people,
and it was full.” One long-term city councilman said “it was one o f the most
controversial things that we ever did.”

City C Analysis
Problem Identification
One o f the central tenets o f the rational model o f decision making (see
Figure 2 in Chapter III) is the assumption that the problem to be solved is clear and
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unambiguous. In this case, the problem was clearly defined. There was a general
consensus among the respondents regarding the problem to be addressed. There was
a single, fairly well defined goal to be achieved— improved community aesthetics.
There were, however, other benefits and objectives given as reasons for the
service change. According to the city manager, another important objective was “to
get mandatory garbage collection in the city. There were concerns about some
property owners who did not have garbage service and they would “find ways to get
rid o f it.” In fact, the city was devoting an employee to investigating trash that was
being dropped olfin various public and business sites in the city.
The mayor was seriously concerned about their image when visitors came to
the community. The senior staff concurred in that “it was primarily aesthetic and we
had a feeling that we could save money if we did it under one contract.” The city
manager said, “The other problem was that we could have as many five, six, seven
garbage companies going down the same street every day which was ridiculous and
when you looked at it, well, that can’t be very efficient and cost effective.” Cost,
efficiency, and effectiveness are all indicators o f the rational decision process, but
the manager’s focus was not primarily on costs. He said that the community “just
looked shabby.” The city manager went on to say that there were a number o f
private haulers in the city at one time and that there was no uniformity in how
garbage was put out and the kind o f containers. The assistant city manager said that
he felt that the problem was “primarily aesthetics. People would put their trash
o u t. . . in a helter-skelter way.”

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
The city manager’s primary goal was to institute mandatory garbage
collection to enhance the appearance o f the community. Efficiency and costs
savings, both central tenets in the rational and bounded rational decision model,
were secondary to the mandatory garbage collection. It was hoped that the new
process would be more efficient, but all o f the respondents noted that total costs
were unknown at the time o f the decision and as such could not be considered as a
major factor in the problem.
Another problem identified by both the administrative staff and several
council members was a lack o f an effective recycling program. While the board
members stated that aesthetics were a major issue, they also were concerned about
the lack o f a comprehensive or mandatory recycling program in the community.
The staff did some analytical work to present their case to the board, yet
they admitted that there were several unknowns. Secondary data, a PowerPoint
presentation to the board on this issue, indicated that the city manager’s office had
limited the problem to only the aesthetics issue. Total costs would be evaluated in
the future. A rational decision maker is assumed to have complete information on
the problem prior to a decision. In this case, the decision was made without
complete cost information. One o f the key decision makers said that they just
decided to give it a try. The decision makers were willing to accept the fact that they
didn’t have complete information and yet were willing to go ahead with their
decision, a key indicator in the bounded rational model.
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One o f the central tenets o f the bounded rational model assumes that the
decision maker scans the environment for conditions that call for a decision. A
review o f the secondary data, meeting minutes and news articles, did not indicate a
push by the public to deal with this problem or that the public felt that there was a
problem with the current solid waste system. In local government, one external
condition that is considered in problem identification is public complaints. Public
records do not indicate an unusual number o f complaints. It appears that in this case
the administration saw a problem independent o f public opinion and moved ahead to
find solutions to what they perceived as a problem.

Solutions and Alternatives
From the outside looking into this organization, it appeared that the rational
decision approach was used in their decision making in that the decision makers
were focused on a well-defined problem set and had considered a number o f
possible ways to achieve their goals. As the decision developed to the point o f
identifying alternatives and selecting a solution to the problem, however, the
decisional model shifted quickly to include elements o f the bounded rational
decisional approach.
One o f the assumptions o f the bounded rational approach is that the decision
maker will make decisions based upon previous experience. The solutions
considered in this case by the administration and presented to the board were very
narrowly tailored to the knowledge and experience o f the city manager. This city
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manager indicated in his interview that he had gone through a similar experience in
another city where they decided to bring the entire service in-house. Based upon this
experience, the city manager recommended to the board that they try an exclusive
franchise. Following up on the question o f “what solutions or alternatives were
considered,” one senior staffer said that “the city manager was not in favor o f doing
it in-house. I believe he had done that at his previous place o f employment. I think
he preferred to look at privatization based a little on experience, so that’s what we
took a look at.” The alternatives considered by the staff and presented to the board
were limited, clearly a bounded rational approach.
One o f the assumptions o f the rational model is that all the alternatives
would be explored, ranked, and presented, but, in this case, the mayor and board
were satisfied with considering only one alternative, which is consistent with a
bounded rational approach to this decision. In response to whether other alternatives
were considered, the mayor said “there was the alternative o f bringing it on as a
completely city run service, I think we might have thought about that for a
microsecond.” The mayor expressed a concern that the addition o f this service, inhouse, would attract another union and in the end increase costs. The mayor said
that they “work pretty well with our unions,” but he was not in favor o f bringing in
another one that would likely be a fairly high-paid group. A senior staffer agreed
saying, “The one thing we didn’t do Was buy garbage trucks and hire employees. We
didn’t consider that alternative.” Supporting this premise, senior staff reported that
there was only a limited comparison o f an in-house service versus contracting it out.
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One o f the finance staff indicated that his report compared only possible staff costs
with private costs and did not take into consideration capital costs. He went on to
say that he felt that “it’s one o f those situations where you say ‘let’s bid it, and see
how it goes’; if we don’t like it, w e’ll look at doing it in-house.”
The attitude o f adopting a position with the knowledge that it may need to
be reexamined is also an indicator o f the bounded rational decision approach. They
were also willing to adjust if, after the fact, they found that they had miscalculated.
This is supported by a respondent’s statement saying that they would “try it for a
year and see how it works.” Secondary data, the franchised contract, indicate that
this option was protected by making the first contract short term, thereby allowing
for either a renewal or the need to start the process over.
Consistent with the bounded rational model, decision makers accepted the
first alternative that was satisfactory with the information that they had at the time.
The fact that the board moved ahead with limited information is supported by
secondary data. A review o f city minutes and agenda support materials found no
records o f an analysis o f in-house or city production costs. Hence, it is likely that the
only real solution considered from the beginning was built around franchising the
service.
There was no evidence o f the public choice model in this case during the
search for alternatives or solutions. The relevant public choice central tenet is that
decision makers select alternatives and solutions that maximize personal benefits and
that decision makers seek to maximize their budgets. There is no evidence that the
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city manager or staff, in presenting limited alternatives, had self-interest as a motive.
The failure to provide a complete analysis o f cost also indicated that the manager
and staff were not attempting to maximize their budget.

The Decision-Making Process
Fundamental to this city’s decisional process is a clear division o f authority.
In a city manager form o f government, the manager is responsible for the day-to-day
operations o f the city and the board is identified as the final policy-making authority.
The city manager declared that “in his experience that there is a good separation o f
the policy-making type o f decisions and the day-to-day decision making.” He went
on to say that
the mayor and council have a good understanding o f the differences between
those two. And, at the same time, at the staff level when there are major
policy issues, they should be made by the elected official, not those o f us
who are not elected. The council feels that’s what we pay you people for, do
the job right, and for the most part, it’s not unusual for the council to raise
the issue, this is costing us this amount o f bucks, is there a better way to do
this.
Secondary data, the city charter, indicate that the city manager and the board closely
adhere to the provisions in the charter detailing their respective authority, which
may be a major factor in the effectiveness o f their decision making. This is a slight
variance from the bounded rational model in that in the bounded rational decision
makers usually wait for problems to present themselves.
Both the city manager and the mayor were able to detail a formal decision
making process, while nearly all o f the remaining respondents were able to describe
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in detail key aspects o f how the city goes about making decisions. The following is a
description o f the city’s decision-making process reconstructed from interview data
and secondary data in the form o f budget memos and board minutes. The city board
meets four times a month— two business meetings and two study sessions. M ost o f
the major items on the board’s agenda have been discussed in detail in the biweekly
study sessions. In the study sessions, the city manager and board will invite outside
resources to build knowledge concerning the issues being discussed. The manager
said that he might “bring in department heads, or some outside resources . . . and the
council will usually have the opportunity to ask questions or ask for more
information.” From the study session, a general consensus o f the board is formed.
The manager and the mayor seem to be the vote counters and most often the
advocates.
Once a consensus is reached and everyone is comfortable moving the item
forward, the city manager will develop a formal administrative recommendation.
The city manager said that his office will prepare a report “that gives the
background and a specific recommendation, but then we usually will attach a lot o f
the background information from the dept, heads and the options they have looked
at.” The formal recommendation will then become a part o f the board’s agenda and
sent as a part o f the board meeting packet.
The board decision process is quite formal following the rules outlined in the
city charter and resolutions adopting Roberts Rules o f Order as the parliamentary
process to direct the meetings. The mayor was very firm in stating that the meeting
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time was “the board’s” time to discuss the issue, and that the public was given an
opportunity at the beginning and at the end o f each meeting to have comments on
their agenda items. This is very structured and would not be very acceptable in most
communities. After the introduction o f an issue, some items o f a financial nature and
others identified by charter are required to have a public hearing in addition to the
board’s discussions. After the public hearing is closed, the board entertains motions
regarding the decision and, if supported, a vote is taken.
The respondents all made it clear that most o f the city’s decisions start in the
annual strategic planning process. The city manager stated that the week-to-week
decision process is a “system that feeds itself.” He stated that the
strategic planning process sets the priorities, this is what we need to work on
as staff, sometimes there’s directives from the council from one meeting to
the next, but I think the big projects and big programs and services are pretty
much decided during the budget process.
Secondary data, city minutes, clearly indicate that the strategic planning is central to
their decision-making process. A review o f secondary data shows that no major
projects were attempted outside those that were identified as part o f the annual
budget process.
Each year prior to the budget planning process, the city has what they call
“coffee with the council.” The board advertises a Saturday morning “coffee with the
council” held in the council chambers. The board, along with the administration, has
displays that show ongoing project,s and each o f the council members have their
own table and people can come in and talk to any council member about anything.
After meeting with the public, the board will meet with the entire senior staff. At
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that meeting, the department heads give the board their top 10 issues and the board
will ask questions about those issues. These meetings are in preparation for the
city’s annual strategic planning retreat where the board and city manager and senior
administrative staff set goals and priorities each year. These meetings start with the
city manager and the staff listing their priorities and giving status reports on current
goals and objectives. The administration and board discuss trends and projections in
relation to current and proposed goals and objectives.

Decision-Making Environment
Is planning key to a good decision-making environment? One o f the
department heads believes it is.
I think the key is to get it channeled in the right way and most o f the time,
the council is not making policy decisions without input from the staff, and
that we are not throwing stuff at the city council without giving them
adequate information beforehand, so I think that the planning process we
have at the beginning o f the year . . . keeps our communications open and
the fact that we don’t have standing committees, every time we meet it is the
entire city council, we all hear the same thing.
In this last statement it is clear that there is a sense o f trust between the
administration and the board. A policy o f no standing committees is not always the
case in government organizations. One o f the indicators o f the need to use a
contingency model o f decision making is the existence o f strong committees that are
influencing the decision process, clearly not a factor in this case.
Organizational leadership and respect for each other seems to be a key factor
in creating what appears to be a collegial decisional environment. For example, the
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mayor said that he would rather put off a vote than embarrass a fellow board
member on an issue. In what is typically a political environment, this is a rare
statement. This is contrary to one o f the central tenets o f the public choice model,
which indicates that “individual preferences or values become more important than
that o f the organization or community as a whole.” This professional respect seems
also to be the basis for long tenures o f service in the city for both city officials and
employees. The city manager and the senior staff involved with this case had all been
with the city for over 15 years. In addition to the administrative staff, the mayor and
the majority o f the city board have had over 10 years o f city service. I note this as
foundational to what was an unusually well planned decision process.
From the findings o f this research, there seems to be a direct correlation
between elected board stability and the cooperative decisional environment. This
seems to translate into a positive employer-employee environment. Secondary data,
city minutes, indicate almost no employee complaints or union grievances for years.
Following up on this with the respondents, it was found that there is a very formal
and purposeful process by which everyone had a part in the city’s decision-making
process, including employees. I found no respondents who felt that they had been
left out o f the process.
This stable environment discounts the need to turn to an alternate decision
process as is suggested in the contingency model as summarized in Figure 5,
Chapter III. The organizational leadership and structure are strong, and they seem to
have a very effective decision process that deals effectively with complex
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environmental factors, all o f which would be indicators in the contingency
framework. In the past, when there has been a lack o f technical knowledge, the
board has brought in help from the outside to provide input. Consistent with the
bounded rational decision theory, the board is willing to make incremental changes
or wait long periods o f time to accomplish their goals. Planning seems to be central
to this aspect o f their decision process.
The decision environment in this case continues to support a finding o f a
bounded rational decision approach. While the decision process was very detailed,
the decision makers in this case limited the alternatives under consideration, which
also limited the possible outcomes. In addition, limited information was provided
and cost was a secondary factor to structure o f the services delivery system, both
indicators o f a bounded rational decision process.

Implementation and Evaluation o f the Decision
Implementation and evaluation seems to be the weakest link in City C’s
decision-making process. This is well recognized by the administration and board
and somewhat accepted. The responses to the question as to a formal evaluation
process ranged from “I guess you just see how it plays out” to “we don’t have a
formal process where we sit back and say it’s time to look at that decision and how
did we do,” and “not per se.”
One respondent did indicate that they “do rather extensive goals and
objectives analysis every year as part o f our budget process.” A senior staff member
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stated that all o f their services have a 10-year fiscal history, and that they provide
them in a graph form so the board can visually see where things are and as
background information for projected goals. Consistent with the bounded rational
model, the city manager stated that from this process they “identify the 10-15
projects that get worked into our goals and objectives.” Primary and secondary data
indicate that the city’s primary point o f evaluation occurs during their annual budget
process. When the city manager puts together the recommended budget, evaluation
takes the form of input from the public, the board, and the city staff.
The typical administrative answer regarding evaluation was “we review it
(decisions) when the contract is up.” This attitude is indicative o f the bounded
rational approach in that the decision makers are willing to make a decision knowing
that incremental policy shifts may be required to make the decision work. In this
case, the contract was a multi-year contract with renewal provisions. A review o f
the information provided to the board for their decision shows that no benchmarks
were established upon which to evaluate the decision. One senior staff indicated that
“about every ten years the city does a citizen survey over multiple topics.” The city
manager seemed to be the only one concerned about the limited review o f decision
but also has not acted to make formal policy changes to correct this issue to date.

Conclusions
The decision-making process in this case indicates a blend o f two decisional
models. The city’s formal decision-making process comes close to that o f the
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rational model in the process and planning aspects o f decision making, but fails to
meet several o f the central tenets and assumptions o f the model. The problem to the
decision makers was very clear and there was consensus as to a general set o f goals
to be obtained. But the data indicate clearly that the city manager limited the
alternatives to be considered early in the process. There was no attempt to present
all the alternatives, rank them, and evaluate their respective probabilities o f success.
As indicated in the literature, it is not likely that the rational model would be
associated with any o f the cases, but it continues to be a part o f most managers’
goals in the decision process.
The public choice model was rejected on the basis that the majority o f the
public was opposed to what they did at the time. Not a vote-getting decision. Vote
maximization is a central tenet o f the public choice model. In addition, the decision
makers did not select alternatives that benefited them personally, although the mayor
indicates that the public has been very happy with the decision long term.
In examining this decision from the bounded rational model, we find that the
decision process meets several o f its central tenets and assumptions and is the best
fit to describe this decision. In the decision whether or not to privatize the public
service, the data support the fact that the city manager limited the alternatives
presented to the board which were based upon his experience in another city. These
factors are clear indicators o f the bounded rational model.
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City D

City D Case History
This case involves the decision to bring the management and operation o f a
recreational facility in-house that had previously been managed by a private
company. At the time o f this decision, the recreational facility in question had been
managed and operated by a private firm for five years. The tw o years leading up to
this decision were enveloped in heated debates regarding operation o f the facility.
The previous city manager involved in the bonding, construction, and privatization
o f this recreational facility was besieged with demands to correct the alleged
mismanagement o f the facility. Instead, the city manager retired in the midst o f the
conflict.
To fully understand the conflict surrounding this decision, it is necessary to
go back to the inception o f the recreational facility. The city manager at the time, a
long-term employee, originally proposed the bonding and construction o f the
recreation facility and was granted permission to study the feasibility o f the project.
A private accounting firm conducted the feasibility study. The city contracted with a
financial and management consulting firm to provide projections on construction,
management, and maintenance cost as well as their expected revenue flow.
Projections provided to the board showed that there would be sufficient revenue
flow to fund both debt service on bonds and to operate the facility. The board
approved the project and authorized the sale o f building authority bonds to
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construct the facility. Revenues to maintain and operate the facility would come
from user fees, concessions, and retail sales.
Since the city lacked experience operating and maintaining a recreation
facility, the city manager recommended that the city solicit bids from private
management firms. The management contract was negotiated by the city manager
and approved by the board unanimously at a regular board meeting. The contract
stipulated that the private firm had the full responsibility to manage and operate the
facility, concessions, and the retail store. Their payment was based upon a percent o f
gross revenues the facility generated.
Secondary data indicate that the city had two goals in regard to the
operation o f the facility. First, the facility was to enhance recreational opportunities
in the community, and second, the facility was to generate enough revenue to pay
off the bonds. However, secondary data show that under the management o f the
private firm, only the first o f these two goals was being realized. This fact is at the
heart o f the later decision made by the board. The facility as managed and operated
was making a profit for the private firm, but the city’s percent o f revenue was not
sufficient to cover the bond debt service. Under extreme pressure from one board
member, the city contracted with another consulting firm to do a fiscal and
management audit o f this operation. The audit showed that, while not managed
extremely well, no funds were missing and that the original data used to promote the
decision were flawed. The original cash flow projections were overly optimistic. So
the original decision related to this case was based upon flawed or incomplete
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information. While insufficient cash flow to fund the bond debt was a serious issue,
it was only a symptom o f a much deeper problem.

City D Analysis
Problem Identification
The problem, as presented in this case, was citizen reaction to the private
management and operation o f a publicly owned recreational facility. Board minutes
show that the problem was initially brought to the attention o f the city manager by
parents o f children using the facility. The focus o f the parents’ complaint was that
the facility manager was giving scheduling preference to groups he had formed.
After several months o f what was perceived as “no action” on the part o f the city
manager, the group started going to board meetings on a regular basis, requesting
action. From the beginning, the board was divided as to what constituted the
problem and how it should be addressed. Hence, their first actions in regard to this
issue failed to meet one o f the basic tenets o f the rational decision process, a clear
identification o f the problem.
One o f the responsibilities o f the private management firm was to schedule
the use o f the facility by the general public and sports organizations. Another
responsibility was the identification and development o f groups to use the facility.
This was an important contractual provision since it was primarily through these
consistent long-term user groups that the city was able to fund the debt service on
the facility. The management firm was so successful in this objective that scheduling
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times for everyone that wanted to use the facility was difficult. Usage o f the facility
grew to the point that there wasn't enough time in the day to accommodate
everyone who wanted to use the facility. The problem then became who should have
a priority in the use o f the facility. According to parents o f a competing user group,
the facility manager had given the groups he had developed all o f the prime times in
the facility, hence the commencement o f a two-year political battle over the private
maintenance and operation o f this recreational facility.
It is important to note that as this issue developed, the competing user group
developed into a very large and active special interest group. One board member
joined forces with the special interest group in an effort to force a review o f the
management firm and its policies. Board meeting minutes indicate that after a period
o f time another board member joined this alliance and together they were speaking
on behalf o f the special interest group. Consistent with the public choice model, the
special interest group was able to maximize their influence through this alliance.
Also consistent with one o f the central tenets o f the public choice model, the
decision makers helped to identify the problem in a way that would benefit their selfinterest. The board members were seeking votes and the special interest group was
seeking a policy change.
The mayor, under pressure from a board member that supported this effort,
set up an ad-hoc committee to study the problem. One indicator o f the public choice
model is that the decision makers will actively seek public or special interest
participation. When this committee met with the contract manager, it was found that
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the group did have access, but that the times o f access were not acceptable to them.
In reviewing the city’s contract with the private firm, it was determined that
technically the management firm was within its rights to schedule the groups. The
latter was reported back to the board at a public meeting where the audience was
full o f members o f this group. Obviously this was not what the group wanted to hear
and it quickly became a very political issue.
The existence o f the special interest groups is an indicator o f the public
choice model. The special interest groups were the primary factor in identifying the
problem and influencing how this decision was made. The special interest groups
were able to maximize their influence on the board with a promise o f assistance at
election time. Buying votes with political favors is central to the public choice
model. The identification o f the problem as seen from the perspective o f the special
interest group was accomplished with the help o f two board members, both up for
reelection.
The special interest groups took sides both on the board and in the
community. Board meeting minutes indicate that in one o f the many meetings that
followed the introduction o f this issue, members o f the special interest group
heckled nonsupportive board members. Public officials operating from the public
choice perspective seek to cultivate voters, not alienate them. With growing support
on the board, the special interest group then changed their point o f attack to the
management o f the facility. With such a large group complaining about the
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operation o f the facility, the board agreed to conduct an audit to make sure that
nothing improper was being done.
The report showed that fiscally everything was in order and that the manager
was running the facility within his rights under the contract. Two board members,
now representing the interests o f the special interest group, stated in a public
meeting that they did not accept the report and asked that another independent firm
be retained to do another audit. Board meeting minutes show that a second audit
was conducted which indicated that there were things that could be improved, but
nothing major was wrong.
While public choice is clearly the dominant model in this case, there are also
indicators that the public choice decision process was adopted as a result o f
environmental factors consistent with the contingency model. A weak leadership
structure, unstable political environment, internal committees, and a dependence on
outside professionals are all indicators o f a contingency decision model. An
additional indicator is the accountability structure surrounding the decision, in this
case, a poorly written contract with the management firm. A review o f secondary
data, the private contract, shows that the contract failed to provide for
accountability only requiring a “regular financial report” be provided to the city.
There was no mechanism for legislative oversight and the contract did not have a
termination clause. As a result, some o f the board members felt powerless and
others in the community were frustrated. The combined effect o f these
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environmental factors led to the adoption o f the public choice decision process in
this case.
A central tenet o f the public choice model is that decision makers identify
problems based on self-interest. The political leaders that took up this issue
indicated that they were interested in making this a campaign issue that would help
them to pick up votes in the next election. Others on the board feared opposing the
position o f the special interest group in fear o f votes against them in the next
election. Both o f these two positions are consistent with the public choice
assumption that politicians make decisions that will maximize votes. Thus, the
combination o f a very combustible political environment and self-interest resulted in
the decision to bring the operation o f the recreation facility in-house.

Solutions and Alternatives
The first proposed solution to address this problem was expansion o f the
facility to accommodate all the user groups. Secondary data, board meeting minutes,
indicate that this decision was made upon the recommendation o f the city manager
and was approved by all but one o f the board members. The solution proposed was
limited to a single alternative and was recognized by all to be an incremental solution
that would need to be followed up by another decision, both indicators o f a bounded
rational decision process. Board meeting minutes also indicate that this step in the
decision process is consistent with previous decisions in the city on similar issues.
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The incremental solution was aimed at satisfying some o f the demands o f the special
interest groups concerns.
Funds from a previous project were used to jump start a building process.
Engineering was completed, bids let, and a foundation for an addition was
completed. Additional financing was necessary, however, for the completion o f the
project and the board, now fully involved in a political debate over the management
o f the current facility, decided to defer the decision to a public vote. A bond
referendum for funds necessary to complete the project was rejected by voters.
News articles from this time show that the special interest group, consistent with the
public choice model, maximized their influence by turning out a record number o f
voters to vote against this solution. Also consistent with the public choice model,
board meeting minutes indicate that the special interest group preferred another
alternative— control over the facility and the termination of the private contract.
Hence, the referendum in many ways was also a referendum on the private operation
i

o f the current facility and the city manager. The city manager retired and was
replaced by his assistant.
Despite the referendum result, the majority o f the board was still willing to
consider other options. This is indicated by the board’s discussions following the
defeat o f the recreation referendum. Respondent data indicate that those board
members who were in opposition to positions held by the special interest group
were now concerned that their political future was at risk. The public choice theory
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indicates that public leaders must compete for supporters and money to stay in
power.
Following the referendum, the new city manager asked for time to properly
analyze other options, including contracting with another management firm to
manage all or a portion o f the facility operations or to bring the operation o f the
facility in-house. The manager diligently pursued information and details regarding
various options and presented them in a report and formal presentation. The pursuit
and analysis o f options is consistent with the rational or bounded rational decision
process, but once the options were presented, only one option was seriously
considered. This is consistent with another public choice indicator asserting that
public officials tend to reject meaningful alternatives in favor o f supporting special
interest positions that favor their own interest. Board meeting minutes and
respondent data show that while the discussion concerning solutions began in an
open-ended way, they ended with a determined board member focused on a single
solution. Both the mayor and city manager had explored contracting with another
management company, but the most active opponent to the previous management
company said “that was not even an option.” In the end, this board member’s
persistence was successful and the board agreed to what it termed a temporary
solution and voted to bring the operation in-house. The advocate for the in-house
solution said “you almost feel like we had to get control o f it.” It’s clear from this
board member’s perspective that there really never was more than one option on the
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table. This option was based on a position to maximize power, control, and, in-the
end, votes, all significant indicators o f the public choice model.

Decision-Making Process
A review o f secondary data, board meeting minutes, reports, and memos,
shows that the decision-making process used by the city in this case changed
significantly as public debate on this issue continued. The data support the fact that
the city’s decision process shifted from a bounded rational approach to a public
choice model in response to a hostile political environment.
Respondent data indicate that prior to this decision the board had a high
level o f trust in the city manager and the staff. However, as the confidence in the
manager and staff eroded, the decision process changed from a more typical
bounded rational approach to the public choice process.
The city’s decision-making process followed the council-manager form o f
government and the primary informational source was the city manager’s office.
Informally, the mayor and the city manager established the city’s agenda,
determining which issues would be brought to the board for a formal vote. The city
manager was a long-term appointee o f the city and his institutional memory was
perceived by some as invaluable to public policy making. Typically, city managers
curtail their participation in the decision-making process to day-to-day operational
decisions. In this case, however, the city manager had gained significant informal
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authority in the decision-making process. The elected board almost never rejected or
even questioned recommendations o f the city manager.
In discussing the city’s decision-making process with the current mayor, he
admitted that looking back one must “wonder what was going on in people’s minds,
what were you thinking when you made that decision?” The mayor went on to say
that his decision-making process was much more open than the past administration.
Previously, board questions and comments were discouraged in the public meetings.
In the bounded rational approach, only limited information is sought and only those
decisions that must be made are placed upon the agenda. Both the problems and
solutions are limited to keep as close to the status quo as possible.
There had been an informal process o f informing and polling board members
concerning issues coming before them. This process was meant to make the formal
process, which was televised, appear more organized. The mayor said, “a lot o f their
decisions were just a rubber stamp.” The previous mayor and city manager were
very strong individuals. The mayor said, “there’s nothing wrong with that, maybe in
certain circumstances it’s better than my style, but I would prefer to have a 7-0 vote
after a long discussion than to make a quick decision we would pay for over the
next how many years.”
While the city’s formal decision-making process is rooted in a bounded
rational process, the decision-making process in this case is a lesson in the public
choice model from the beginning to the end. Decision makers identified the problem
based on their own self-interest, solicited support from a special interest group, and
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sought to maximize votes by reflecting the goals o f that same group in their
decisions. The problem was identified by the special interest group and was defined
and redefined by board members that supported this group. Consistent with the
public choice model, individual interests supplanted the interest o f the public as a
whole. The political leaders in this case either gained politically at the polls or in
preserving the appearance o f leadership.

Decision-Making Environment
The decisional environment is at best hostile. Anyone who considered taking
an opposing position to that o f the special interest group in this case was publicly
decried and even booed when they tried to carry on public business. The public
choice model indicates that individuals will come together in politics for their own
mutual benefit. Another public choice indicator is that elections can trigger the need
to influence either voters or politicians. The board members who were supporting
the special interest group in this case were facing an impending election. Voters with
a special interest wanted to maximize their influence by bringing maximum pressure
on the board prior to this election. Both the primary and secondary data indicate that
this negative environment was used by some o f the board members to gain political
power and improve their chances o f reelection. This negative environment also, in
part, led to the retirement o f the previous city manager and had many o f the board
members determined to never run for public office again.
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Upon the retirement o f the previous city manager, some o f the board
members believed that this was an opportunity to resolve this long-standing conflict.
It was at this time that two board members pressured the mayor to create an ad-hoc
committee comprised o f members from each side o f this issue to study the problem.
Resolving this problem was really the responsibility o f the city manager, as are all
day-to-day operations and decisions. Hence, the creation o f this group was
problematic from the start in that it infringed on the authority o f the city manager.
With the retirement o f the city manager and the election o f a new mayor, a vacuum
o f power and authority was created.
The fact that the board appointed the assistant city manager as the new city
manager was central to a changed decisional environment. Tenure in office by a city
manager seems to generate an informal power that is difficult to overcome by
elected officials and often a source o f conflict (Starling, 2005). In this case, the
newly appointed city manager was potentially a part o f the problem. One o f the
indicators o f the public choice model is a decision that results in an increase in
political power or control. New city managers tend to be unwilling to exert their
authority or to make changes during their first year, creating a real or perceived
position o f weakness.
In this case, long-term board members saw this as an opportunity to assert
their informal power and authority (Starling, 2005) to accomplish previously
unrealized goals. The board members that had previously felt powerless to deal with
what they saw as a nonresponsive manager o f the recreational facility now voted to
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not renew his contract. Again consistent with the public choice model, this decision,
formulated to win votes, benefited primarily a single special interest group and not
the community as a whole.

Implementation and Evaluation
Implementation o f this decision was handled very differently than it was in
the decisions that led up to the problem seen in this community. The manager and
the board took considerable time to make the decision to bring the management o f
the facility in-house. To be assured o f the right decision, the new city manager asked
for time to study the problem before making a recommendation. To facilitate this
request, it was recommended that the city on a temporary basis contract a portion o f
the operations o f the recreation facility with the firm that did the final audit and
management study. Using a temporary solution to solve a problem is representative
o f a bounded rational decision approach.
Upon completion o f the study, the city manager provided the board with a
detailed cost analysis that recommended bringing the management and operation o f
the facility in-house. The city manager’s report established benchmarks for
evaluation o f the service and a change in the process o f accounting. Board meeting
minutes show that there was still strong board opposition to contracting out this
service again and any other recommendation may have been rejected. The data in
this case show clearly that the final decision favored maximizing existing positions o f
power and authority, a public choice perspective.
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This community, like many others, uses the budget process as their primary
planning and evaluation tool. Review and evaluation o f the prior year’s successes or
failures occurs during budget review sessions. In a review o f the city’s budget, it is
evident that incremental decision making was their primary decision process, as only
slight changes in total budgetary amounts occurred from year to year in any o f the
departments. Incremental decision making is typical o f a bounded rational model.
The only other point o f evaluation was an individual assessment o f public
complaints. When respondents were asked what systems o f evaluation were in place,
they typically did not know, but were quick to add that “if there were a problem that
they would hear about it.” In this case, those complaints became the basis for two
board members to maximize their position with voters and increase their personal
power, consistent with the public choice model. This system o f evaluation, reacting
to citizen complaints, is inconsistent and is subject to the influences o f special
interests. Often, when an issue becomes so large that board members are starting to
“hear about it,” the problem is out o f control.

Conclusions
The public choice model was strongly indicated in this case in that a special
interest group identified the problem and sought ways to maximize their influence on
board members. Both positive and negative methods o f influence were exercised.
The positive influence is seen in that members o f the special interest group worked
directly for the re-election o f those board members who supported their cause. On
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the other hand, secondary data indicate that in public meetings, members o f the
special interest group threatened to vote out board members who did not support
their positions.
It is also clear from respondent data some board members were able to
significantly enhance their power and authority by speaking on behalf o f the special
interest group. Previous to this issue, under another administration, this board
member indicated that he was disregarded and marginalized consistently. With a
strong re-election and the vocal support o f the special interest group, his influence
on the board became significant and is consistent with the public choice decision
process.
However, reviewing secondary data, news articles, city minutes, memos, and
budgetary documents, it is clear that this city has a history o f making decisions from
a bounded rational approach. In the case o f previous difficult decisions, the board
had been willing to accept the recommendation o f the city manager without
significant debate. For example, the board approved the initial bonding and
construction o f the recreation facility upon the recommendation o f the city manager
with no debate. In another difficult decision, the board approved a major capital
project o f comparable budgetary size with a neighboring township based upon the
recommendation o f the city manager with little discussion. In each case, the amount
o f information provided to the board was limited and the options were limited only
to those presented by the city manager. These combined facts are indicative o f a
bounded rational decision approach.
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Following the referendum, the administration moved into a political mode o f
making decisions. Respondent data indicate that this shift was as a result o f voter
pressure and a growing distrust o f fellow board members and city staff. The
environmental factors surrounding this case, bitter political infighting on and off the
board, a very active special interest group committed to shaping a policy, and a new
administration with less informal power, seem to be the factors that triggered the
use o f a different decision process. The contingency approach is indicated when
various environmental factors combined lead to a change in a decision method.
The mayor in this case was a strong consensus builder, but consent from
some on the board was only achieved if it was to their own political benefit, a
definite indicator o f the public choice model. This was expressed very clearly by one
board member who indicated that the only reason he was elected was as a result o f
the special interest group in this case. The special interest group that he supported
had completely financed and staffed his campaign. This strongly supports the
premise that his decision was made from the public choice perspective. While only
one or tw o members may have benefited from special interest votes, others feared
votes against them in the future and retreated to protect their own interests rather
than a disinterested pursuit o f public interest. As a central tenet o f the public choice
model, politicians will do what is necessary to maximize votes, power, and
authority.
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C ityE

City E Case History
This case focuses primarily on the decision o f whether or not to privatize
sanitary sewer services. The cases under consideration in cities E and F have a
number o f factual and demographic similarities. The problem that both cities
considered was the same, and the solution that they chose was the same. In order to
rule out possible common decisional processes or outcomes due to contact with
each other, special attention was given to the respondent that originally identified
the problem and recommended a solution. In the case o f City E, the individual was
the city manager. In the case o f City F, the Director o f Public W orks brought the
problem to the board and public works employees presented the solution. There is
no indication from interview data or secondary data that the cities were aware o f the
other city’s decision on this common issue. In both cases, E and F, the cities decided
not to privatize the public service and instead both allowed employees to submit a
proposal to restructure the service. This was a relatively new way to respond to the
issue o f privatization; most cities were either privatizing or not. Up to this period o f
time, the literature surrounding this issue tended to be clearly on one side or the
other (Savas, 1982). There was, however, an emerging concept advocating for the
introduction o f competition in the public/private question (Osborne & Gaebler,
1992). It is quite possible, given the size o f the cities, that the administration was
aware o f this emerging model and used it as a solution to their respective problems.
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I note size as an issue due to the larger organizational structure and staffing levels. It
becomes much more likely that the managers would have had an opportunity to be
up-to-date on emerging public administration models. This is, however, the only
common factor in these two cities. How each city identified the problem, the
solutions presented, and the process o f deciding and how they evaluate decisions are
different.
City E was at a turning point both organizationally and politically. The board
included some long-term members and some relatively new members and a new
mayor. Yet the shift was more than political; it was an organizational move, directed
from the top, to become more efficient and effective. No fiscal crisis loomed and no
major complaints from the community were driving this issue. This issue was being
driven from the top o f the organization and not the bottom.
One o f the senior staff indicated that the decision to consider privatization
came about as a result o f work on becoming a “higher performing organization.”
The city manager met with each o f the departments and requested that they examine
their departments for efficiency and effectiveness. Activities or functions that were
deemed to be inefficient or ineffective were to be reengineered or considered for
privatization. This provided a background for the problem and the solutions
considered.
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City E Analysis
Problem Identification
The problem in this case was initiated and identified by the city manager. The
facts o f this case show a strong indication o f the use o f a bounded rational approach
to decision making. The manager and the mayor both indicated in their interviews a
desire to make decision making more rational in the city. The city manager had just
returned from an executive study program at Harvard where he had studied decision
making. This was reflected in many o f his responses.
In discussing the problem in this case with the city manager, the initial
response was that the problem was an issue o f costs. The city manager indicated
that the goal was to become more cost competitive both internally and externally.
The city manager noted that “nobody was really complaining about the cost o f our
services, but I felt that we could do it better and for less. We had just increased rates
three years in a row and there was a little more sensitivity to it.” He went on to say
that “it w asn’t like you are doing something so that you can keep property taxes low
so in some ways it was not the most logical choice.” A focus on costs or efficiency
is an indicator o f the rational decision process.
A second related issue, expressed by both the mayor and city manager, was
that o f the “rigidity o f their labor contracts.” The city manager felt that there needed
to be radical changes to the workforce, including the city’s contract with the union

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
in this case. In explaining the problem with the union, the city manager said that
“negative employee behavior was being protected by labor agreements.”
A third issue, and possibly the primary problem in the mind o f the city
manager, was the resolution o f “an overall negative climate in the work force.” The
city manager expressed that the real problem in this case was that “the culture in this
department was at the time perhaps the sourest it had ever been.” He went on to say
that “these employees didn’t feel that they were part o f the city organization, since
they were physically removed from the city organization.” Respondent data also
indicate that this issue was at the heart o f the decision.
The identification o f the problem in this case is consistent with bounded
rational indicators. There was not a single well-defined goal to be achieved when
comparing the statements o f all o f the respondents and the supporting secondary
data. The majority o f the board felt that cost was the primary problem in this case.
The mayor cited cost and organizational issues. The city manager, on the other
hand, cited both o f the latter, but felt that the union or organizational culture was
the primary issue that was driving all the others. The fact that there were multiple
goals to be achieved is inconsistent with the central tenets o f the rational decision
process, but is consistent with the bounded rational decision process.
Respondent data indicate that the manager was supported in his effort to
make reforms to the organization. Secondary data, and internal memos, indicate that
this problem had been building for some time and had not been dealt with by a
previous manager who had retired a year prior to this issue. As a relatively new
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manager in this city, it could be argued that the manager only identified this problem
so as to establish himself as a problem solver. This being the case, it could also be
argued that the manager in this step o f the decision process was also acting from a
personal interest in enhancing his position rather than that o f the city, which would
be consistent with a public choice decisional process. In a follow-up interview, the
city manager indicated that while he was aware o f the board’s oversight o f his
performance on this issue, he saw it as a part o f his job to make the organization
more efficient and effective rather than providing any personal gain.

Solutions and Alternatives Considered
This case is a classic example o f an organization whose goal is to be as
rational as possible in a bounded rational environment. The solutions presented in
this case are indicative o f a more autocratic decision process. Solutions may be
identified or proposed from anywhere within an organization but, in this case, the
process was controlled from the top o f the organization. The rational decision model
assumes that there is a correct solution to all problems and that it is management’s
job to find that efficient solution and to implement it.
The city manager said that he didn’t feel that the “incremental approach o f
modifying individual behavior when there are multiple individuals” was going to be
effective. Incremental solutions are typical o f the bounded rational decision process
and are meant to satisfy a need at a particular point in time. An examination o f the
secondary data, city minutes, and a modified employee (union) contract indicates
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that while the city manager did not believe in the “incremental approach,” the final
solution could be considered incremental in that it was phased in to avoid an unfair
labor grievance. This is consistent with a bounded rational model.
Solutions were identified from a wide range o f alternatives and ranked
according to their respective benefit to the city, which is indicative o f a rational
decision process. However, consistent with the bounded rational decision approach,
not all o f the potential alternatives were evaluated or presented to the board. The
mayor indicated that, when possible, solutions are taken from the city’s strategic
planning process. The mayor further indicated that during the planning process, they
identify both problems and goals. The goals are expressed in outcomes so that when
problems surface, solutions are already shaped to achieve these goals.
In this case, the city manager was proactively seeking out efficiency and
effectiveness in each o f the organizational units. The city manager had requested
that each o f the department directors examine their organizations to determine
whether they would benefit from either reorganization or privatization. During the
time that solutions for this problem were being considered, reengineering and
privatization were being promoted heavily in the public management literature
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1982, 1989). This may have had an influence on the solutions
that were considered in this case. In fact, the department head who made a
recommendation to privatize the service had just returned from a conference that
had a session on privatization.
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This solution fit the objectives o f the city manager. The city manager
indicated, however, that his goal was not necessarily to privatize but to “send a
message throughout the organization that we were willing to look at doing things
very differently” and that privatization was an option. Hence, while the solution
presented was to privatize, the real goal was to get the employees and the union to
counter with a competitive proposal to accomplish the same objective but within the
organization. The city manager was, in fact, limiting the options under
consideration, consistent with a bounded rational approach.
A secondary data source quotes the department director saying that he
thought that “consolidation was his main goal.” By this he meant that there should
be a consolidation o f job positions as a part o f the classification system. Employees,
realizing that this proposal would find support on the board, opened a dialogue with
the city administration. The dialogue led to a competitive agreement with the
employees and the union that would reduce the workforce through consolidation o f
positions and changes to the labor agreement that would allow a portion o f those
positions to be taken over by a private operation. The proposal was taken to the
board where it found unanimous approval. Secondary data, city minutes and board
agenda packet, show that the “joint” proposal was supported by significant amounts
o f analytical data. The use o f analytical data to make decisions is an indicator o f a
rational decision approach, but the key decision makers in this case indicated that
they did not use these data in their decision. The majority o f the respondents in this
case indicated that their decision was primarily based upon the recommendation o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116
the city manager. One o f the indicators o f the bounded rational model is that
decision makers will make decisions based upon intuitive or personal experience as
opposed to analytical approaches. This is interesting in that the decision makers had
the ability to examine this decision from a cost-benefit perspective but chose
otherwise.

Decision-Making Process
All o f the respondents in this case confirm that the city’s formal decision
making process follows the traditional functions o f a council-manager form o f
government. The mayor, however, felt that the city’s decision-making process
should be more like that o f the business sector. The mayor indicated that while the
city is not a business, it can learn from the competitive environment o f the business
sector. This seems to have been embraced in an organizational wide approach to the
decision-making process. Both the city manager and the finance director indicated
that this decision came as a result o f a search for best practices in city operations.
The decision making in this city is very formal. One o f the senior staff
indicated that “they are still working in a fairly hierarchical system.” Decisions are
made by senior management and are passed down to be implemented. One
respondent indicated that is often a point o f frustration for some o f the staff. In
discussing this issue further with the city manager, he said that he expects employees
to participate in decision making at the departmental level. A review o f previous
decisions, as found in city minutes, indicates that the organizational environment is
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very open to employee input. Secondary data show that at the departmental level
several groups have been organized to study problems and present possible
solutions. A senior staff member indicated that their decision-making process
included the creation o f teams, inclusive o f employees, to study problems and
propose solutions.
Secondary data, city minutes, agenda packets and budget documents,
indicate that nearly all o f the decisions presented to the board are from a quantitative
perspective where appropriate. The city manager said that he favors a rational
approach to decision making and that an analytical approach is purposeful. Probing
this process with the manager, he was willing to concede that while the ideal is a
rational decision approach, he never felt that he had all the information necessary to
achieve that ideal standard.
As in the other cities in this study, there are both formal and informal aspects
to their decision-making process. Leading up to a serious vote, the mayor
communicates with key decision makers to poll their position on an issue. This
informal consensus building process is often used to decide whether to put off a vote
or to go ahead. A part o f the process is to inform and to solicit input to modify a
proposal so that it will be acceptable to a majority o f the board. The mayor indicated
that he likes to have a clear majority, but that is not always possible. An adjustment
o f the decisional process would typically be an indicator o f a contingency
framework, but in this case the modifications were only in relation to gaining
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consensus on the issue and did not change the decision process from a bounded
rational decision model.
In addition to the mayor’s meetings, the city manager regularly meets with
all o f the members o f the board on a rotating basis. This gives board members an
opportunity to express concerns and to ask questions regarding city operations. On
the city manager’s side, it allows the opportunity to discuss policy issues prior to
making recommendations on an issue. This active or aggressive participation in the
policy aspect o f the decision-making process is unusual for a city manager. Most
city managers avoid this active a role in the decision-making process for fear o f
being linked to one side o f an issue. The city manager indicates that these meetings
assist in shaping policy that reflects the positions o f the board (Newell, 1993).
Problems may be identified at any level in this city. When a problem is
identified, the city manager will put together a team to study the issue and to make a
proposal as to how best to deal with the issue. Members o f the team not only
include senior management, but also include employees and, if necessary, outside
experts. Solutions or alternatives proposed are filtered through the city manager and
only those solutions that are acceptable to the city manager are passed on to the
board. The process creates a decision-making environment that is more indicative o f
the bounded rational decision process. Secondary data, and city minutes, indicate
that the board often makes incremental decisions that need to be adjusted later to
meet the needs o f the city. For example, on a difficult zoning issue the board made
several changes to the same section o f the code over a two-year period o f time to
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satisfy both short-term and long-term residents. This is very indicative o f the
bounded rational decisional model.

Decision-Making Environment
The decision environment in this case played a key role in the decision
process. While the decision-making process is very formal, it is inclusive, allowing
for multiple points o f input. Employees enjoy the opportunity to be a part o f teams
that are assigned to seek solutions to problems that confront the city. Employees are
encouraged to find ways to save the city costs and are rewarded financially when
their ideas create savings. This was also the case in this decision. Employees were
able to financially share in the cost savings that were realized in the departmental
reorganization. Secondary data and committee reports indicate that citizens were
also afforded an opportunity to participate in the decision process by serving on
committees. This added step in the decision process seemed to have the effect o f
defusing employee and citizen hostility and improving the decision environment.
It is important to note that secondary data indicate that the city’s decisional
environment has not always operated in this way. At the time that this decision was
made, one o f the primary factors leading to a threat o f privatization was “a sour
labor environment” according to the city manager. Over the years, labor agreements
had protected a number o f employees that were perceived by the administration as
negative influences on the workforce. This factor was central in the mind o f the city
manager in his decision to consider privatization. While labor cost was an issue, all
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o f the respondents agreed that it was not a primary factor. During this resolution o f
the problem in this case, the city manager, in effect, compelled employees to
participate in the decision process. This process has since had a very positive effect
on the decision environment. While decisions are still made in a political
environment, decision making seems to be from a more bounded rational process
than political. This being the case, few elements o f the public choice model were
noted.
Secondary data, board meeting minutes, indicate that the city had several
years before had a history o f making decisions from a public choice perspective.
Those decisions were very political and partisan in nature, leading to heated political
debates and a very hostile employee-employer environment.
Council-manager relations are also very positive in this city. Many o f the
respondents spoke very favorably o f the city manager and his accomplishments. This
seems to have resulted in an extremely high level o f trust. Open and free
communications between the board and the city manager again seem to be a primary
factor. While the proactive approach o f this manager to meeting regularly with all
the board is not typical, it seems to have created an environment that is favorable to
good decision making.
One o f the outcomes o f this positive environment seems to be a heavy
reliance on the city manager’s recommendations. That reliance in turn has led to a
more bounded rational decision process. Respondent data indicate that their
decisions are more intuitive, based upon controlled or limited information and nearly
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always based upon the recommendation o f the city manager. Secondary data, city
minutes, show that the board typically follows the recommendation o f the city
manager without modification.

Implementation and Evaluation
Implementation o f this decision started before the recommendation had the
approval o f the board. As a part o f the decision-making process and identification o f
alternatives, the city administration had prepared cost projections to determine the
range o f savings. Upon the approval by the board, a consultant was hired to do a
comprehensive management study o f the department. It was upon this information
that the recommendations to privatize were made and ultimately became the basis o f
the employee proposal. The implementation o f this alternative from a limited number
o f possible solutions supports a bounded rational decision-making process. In this
case, the negotiation o f a competitive agreement with the employees and the union
as opposed to privatization defused what has in other cities been a difficult
implementation process.
Evaluation o f this project is consistent with the bounded rational decision
making process. Having established benchmarks prior to the consolidation o f the job
classifications allowed for an annual assessment o f the savings to the community.
There were a number o f performance-based measures that became a part o f the
agreement. In this case, they provided regular feedback showing savings since the
city implemented the decision.
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None o f the respondents in this city indicated citizens as a means o f
evaluation for their decision. Citizen feedback is more closely associated with cities
that have political decision-making models. Public choice decision makers evaluate
the success o f their decision upon its value to their political goals and voter feedback
is one o f their primary measures o f success. While many citizens are very active
politically in this city, few o f the public choice indicators were found. Secondary
data indicate that special interest groups were not actively seeking to influence the
privatization decision in this case. The dominant decision-making process, bounded
rational decision making, was able to incorporate a democratic or political element
into their decision making in such a way as to not make it a controlling
environmental factor.

Conclusions
While it could be argued that the city manager in this case benefited from
this decision, it does not seem to rise to the level o f indicating the application o f the
public choice model. Nearly all governmental decisions are made to provide a
benefit. The question is, who benefited and in what way? In this case, the primary
benefit, as perceived by the key decision makers, was to the public in improved
services. Certainly, the employees that retained their jobs benefited, but they were
not involved in the final decision. Similarly, the city manager stood to benefit in that
he gained increased creditability and stature as a city manager having apparently
resolved a long-standing problem. One o f the key assumptions o f the public choice
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theory is that decision makers will identify problems based upon self-interest.
Research data in this case does not indicate existence o f self-interest or that decision
makers stood to gain directly from the decision in this case.
Another o f the public choice assumptions is that politicians tend to maximize
votes. News articles indicate that none o f the key decision makers used this decision
in an election campaign either before or after it was made. In fact, primary and
secondary data indicate that constituents in this community have had a history o f
opposing privatization. Hence, even the suggestion o f privatization as an alternative
is inconsistent with the assumption o f vote maximization. As such, the public choice
model is rejected.
There was no indication o f a competing model o f decision making. A
competing decision process or an unstable decision environment would have
suggested a contingency decision approach. Neither o f these factors or other
contingencies that would suggest the used o f a contingency approach was indicated
in the interviews or secondary data.
Several indicators o f the bounded rational model have been noted in this
analysis. There were many issues considered in this situation, not a single welldefined problem to be resolved. The decision makers noted that cost information
was not important in making their decision, and they accepted the limited
alternatives presented by the city manager and followed his recommendations.
The facts o f this case indicate that this decision was made from a bounded
rational perspective. The key decision makers recognized an internal organizational
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environment that required a change. The city manager didn’t believe that a simple
incremental change would resolve the issue and therefore recommended privatizing
the department service. However, the city manager indicated that it was his intention
to “get the employees’ attention” with the threat o f a privatization in order to obtain
the flexibility that the city sought in dealing with this problem. So, in reality, the
initial solution presented was an incremental approach to resolving this problem.
The key decision makers in this case indicated that they knew that the initial
recommendation to privatize the service could have created a huge political fight but
were willing to take the risk to obtain their goal. The majority o f the key decision
makers believed that a compromise would be reached once the recommendation was
presented. This incremental approach to a goal was rewarded with the employee
counter proposal to the privatization. Hence, the administrative team was
empowered to negotiate with the employees and the union to achieve their goal.
There exists one outstanding question, how they plan to measure improvement to a
sour workforce.

City F

City F Case History
This case involves the decision o f whether to privatize the management and
operation of the city’s wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). City management was
under considerable public and board pressure to cut costs and to resolve ongoing
budget problems. One respondent noted that “two years prior the action by the city
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commission, that the department’s fund balance was in essence zero.” In this fiscally
stressed environment, the high costs o f municipal-run operations led to the board’s
decision to investigate privatizing. Leading up to this decision, a number o f studies
had been published detailing the potential savings to be generated by privatizing
public services (Ahlbrandt, 1973; Hike, 1993; Moore, 1988; Savas, 1974, 1977).
The city therefore considered the privatization o f a public service in order to solve a
fiscal problem.
Privatization o f municipal services was not new to the city. Over the years
the city had used private companies to provide a number o f services including
parking enforcement, janitorial, recreational facility operations, and waste water
plant management. At the time o f this decision, the city had already been contracting
out key operations o f the WWTP for a period o f eight years. In light o f their
budgetary problems, and since a significant part o f wastewater treatment operations
had previously been privatized, the board requested an investigation into the cost o f
a fully privatized operation. The city contracted with a private firm to study the
management and operations o f the WWTP. The consultants’ report indicated that
approximately $1 million could be saved annually through full privatization.
Upon presenting the report to the board, the city manager recommended that
they solicit proposals from private firms for the full management and operation o f
their WWTP. Before request for proposals could be prepared and advertised, the
director o f the WWTP shared the private firm’s report with his employees and
encouraged them to prepare their own proposal Fearing the loss o f their jobs,
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WWTP employees, with the help o f management, prepared and submitted their own
proposal to the board. The employee proposal reflected nearly all the changes
recommended in the consultants’ report. Their proposal recommended significant
changes, including consolidating portions o f the plant under municipal operation that
were currently contracted out. The employee proposal also included realigning job
classifications, reducing positions, and cross training WWTP staff to enhance
productivity. The final part o f their proposal required the city to invest in facilities so
as to enhance energy savings and to comply with regulatory changes.
The city manager, working with the director o f the WWTP, reviewed the
proposal and agreed to send it to the board for their consideration. A special board
meeting was set for the employees to present their proposal. Following the
presentation, the city manager changed his recommendation to support this new
competitive service arrangement. The board accepted the employee proposal,
allowing for a three year implementation period. As a footnote to this decision, it
must be noted that during the time o f this decision, competitive service
arrangements, rather than privatizing public services, were beginning to be reported
in several cities across the country (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 85). As noted in
the previous section, another city in this study was considering the privatization o f
their WWTP and also decided on a competitive service arrangement with their
employees. This decision and the process by which it was made will be considered in
the following analysis. A side-by-side analysis o f these two cases is examined in the
comparative analysis section o f this research.
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City F Analysis
Problem Identification
The problem in this case was initially fiscally driven and the board entered
this decision process from a bounded rational decision-making approach. However,
as the case developed, the board’s decision-making process changed and adapted to
the contingencies o f an unstable organizational and political environment. The facts
o f this case indicate elements o f a bounded rational decision model that was,
however, driven by a contingency framework.
Identification o f the problem in this case was straightforward. The board, in
response to ongoing WWTP departmental deficits, demanded that excessive
expenditures be cut. A cost revenue analysis o f municipal operations was the basis
o f the board’s directive. The WWTP department functions as an enterprise fund,
deriving its revenues from service fees. In theory, enterprise funds operate like a
business and as costs o f operation go up, those costs are passed along to the
customer. The board expressed a concern that the operations o f the WWTP were
not being run efficiently and therefore were costing the customers more than they
should have to pay for services. The issue o f efficiency was based upon their analysis
o f the higher than usual personnel cost. The reliance o f the board on analytical data
in their decision process indicates a more rational decision approach.
The reports provided to the board, however, did not provide sufficient data
to make a definitive determination as to whether costs were truly excessive. A
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deficit in the WWTP budget could simply mean that they need to increase fees as
opposed to the need to reduce the costs o f operations. Nonetheless, several o f the
board members felt that the trend o f increasing cost needed to be reversed. The
bounded rational decision process is indicated in that the board members relied on
limited information in identifying the problem.
One board member expressed a concern that the WWTP department was
overly classified and not flexible enough to service the needs o f the city. In
questioning as to what this member meant by this statement, he indicated that
unionized employees had been classified with extreme specificity. This board
member cited the problem as being the “restrictions that the unions had got us into
for years.” For example, within the WWTP division there were maintenance
employees whose classification o f “electrician” would not permit them to change
light bulbs. Another was that o f “painter,” whose job was only to paint. The problem
in the eyes o f this board member was that some employees were not permitted to do
other maintenance functions within the facility regardless o f need. Modifying the
classification system was a primary issue with at least one long-term board member.
Board meeting minutes indicate that this board member expressed this concern in
the meeting, leading to a review o f departmental costs. Interview data with this
board member also indicate that this same board member followed up by actively
lobbying other board members to support forcing the union to accept changes to
their agreement with the threat o f privatization. While a reorganization or
classification modification could be identified as a fiscal concern, the respondent
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related this concern more in terms o f dealing with an employee problem or union
problem rather than that o f an economic issue.
One board member focused on a single alternative, that o f privatization,
saying in their board meeting that “w e’ve got to privatize, we can do it a lot
cheaper, and we have studies that show that.” One o f the staff members indicated
that when a department is shown to be extremely inefficient, the board has
historically looked at the option o f privatizing the service. In this case, the problem
presented by the concerned board member rose to this level. The board directed the
city manager to contract with a consultant to determine how much would be saved
by privatizing the entire WWTP operation. The city had used privatization to
provide a variety o f services to its citizens in the past and was open to the idea
again. In this case, the board not only participated in identifying this problem, but
they directly sought out one alternative as a potential solution.
The board was divided on the issue o f privatization. While the board often
considered the option o f privatization, one board member was always adamantly
opposed to privatization o f city services. The decision process at this stage has
elements o f the public choice decision model in that individual board member
preferences influenced how they identified the problem.

Solutions and Alternatives
An initial review o f the interview data suggests that the city was rational in
their approach to seeking solutions and decision making in general. The mayor
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described an organized and methodical process by which the board looks at a
problem and seeks solutions. Board members described a process by which the
board directs the city manager and/or the staff to gather information and to bring it
back for their review prior to deciding an issue. The mayor explained that the board
also meets in a workshop setting “occasionally” to identify solutions and to narrow
alternatives for difficult issues as well as to gather information from staff or outside
consultants in an effort to better understand an issue.
Even though the board does use these various methods to identify solutions
and narrow alternatives, it is the exception rather than the rule. The process by
which the board narrows alternatives is often ineffective. Respondent data,
confirmed by board meeting minutes, indicate that on many occasions the board did
not use any o f these processes or made their final decision from an alternative not
identified through one o f these processes. As can be seen in the introduction o f this
case, the board did not use either o f these processes to identify alternatives, and
instead, encouraged by a long-term board member, they quickly turned to outside
consultants to investigate one alternative, privatization, over many others that were
available to them. Hence, the information and solutions they sought were limited.
This bounded rational approach with limited alternatives seems to be very
acceptable to the mayor and some o f the board members. In fact, the mayor stated
that he preferred to have only one alternative presented to the board as a
recommendation.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131
This process o f identifying solutions and alternatives also corresponds with
several o f the indicators found in the contingency decision approach. The limited
knowledge related to this problem, the high dependence on outside professionals,
the budget constraints, and the inability o f the board to reach a consensus are all
factors that led to a contingency process.
An analysis o f board minutes and resolutions indicates that the city has a
high dependence on outside consultants. Secondary data also show that on nearly
every major decision made by the board an outside consultant was used to provide
analytical support. This level o f dependence is a key indicator o f the contingency
decision model.
The facts o f this case and the secondary data show that this city has a history
o f not staying within any norms o f a decision process for any period o f time. The
use o f various decision models is also an indicator o f a contingency decision
process. Board meeting minutes show that the board may make a decision in one
case using a bounded rational approach, only to replace that decision within a short
time with a purely political solution. In this case, the board adopted the consultant’s
recommendation to privatize, and within two weeks reversed its decision and
approved a counter proposal from the WWTP employees. Interview data indicate
that only one board member was extremely vexed at the way in which solutions
were limited or set aside after having reached agreement. This same board member
indicted that the board had reversed itself on several occasions in the last year.
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The reversal o f decisions is not typical o f the other cities in this study. This
research seems to indicate that cities that have a stable internal and external
environment tend to be consistent in their decision approach. City F has failed at
creating a stable political and organizational environment, an indicator o f the
contingency model. As a result, extreme policy shifts seem to be the norm rather
than the exception in this city.

Decision-Making Process
The governmental structure, like the other cases in this study, is a councilmanager form o f government. Formal decision making for public policy is the
responsibility o f the board upon the recommendation o f the city manager. Day-today decisions and operations fall under the authority o f the city manager. The board
meets twice a month and the agenda is established by the city manager. The mayor
indicated that on difficult issues the city also holds planning workshops or will
establish a committee to study a problem. In each o f these informal meetings, the
board often invites senior staff and outside professionals to add perspective. In these
meetings, the staff identify problems and help to clarify issues that were being
presented to the board.
Information and recommendations on major policy issues are provided by
the city manager’s office. However, there is also an informal step in the city’s
policy-making process. Long-term board members often call senior staff directly for
information on issues and discuss staff recommendations. In this informal process,
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two things happen. First, staff members have direct and significant influence over the
key decision makers, and second, long-term board members are able to influence the
staff to present policy alternatives that are acceptable to them individually. The
result is that board and staff interaction has the effect o f controlling much o f the
formal decision-making process. This informal decisional environment has been in
existence for many years and seems to have been institutionalized administratively.
This informal process indicates elements o f the public choice model by significantly
increasing individual board members’ power and control in the decision-making
process and establishing informal political coalitions o f individuals in the decision
process.
Considering the form o f government and the organizational structure, one
would expect that problem identification and solutions would primarily emanate
from the city manager’s office. However, decision making in this city is primarily
driven from the department level o f the organization and, informally, from long-term
board members. Board meeting minutes indicate that some problems are identified
by the board in their meetings, but this is not the norm. Both problems and solutions
are predominantly generated at the department level and are passed on to the city
manager’s office. The city manager’s office acts as a peer review and comment
phase o f the decision-making process. M ost department recommendations are
brought forward for consideration by the board, some with and some without the
city manager’s recommendation for approval. This is not typical o f the decision
making process found in other council-manager cities. In examining the other cases
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in this study, if a city manager did not approve o f a department’s proposal, it was
not presented to the board for their review.
Primary and secondary data clearly indicate that the board’s decision
methods shift with the level and type o f decision being made; this is consistent with
a contingency decision framework. The board ebbs back and forth on issues,
alternatives and solutions depending on the decisional environment. Examining this
case from the contingency framework rendered a completely new perspective and
made sense from an otherwise fluid decisional process. Timing and decision
environment factors are central elements in their decision-making model. The board
varies how it decides issues based upon the situation.
The down side to this method o f decision making is that there is limited
consistency among their decisions. No one can predict how the board will react to a
particular set o f facts given the board make-up and the timing o f the issue. A
positive side o f this decision-making approach is that the board is flexible to its
environment and willing to adjust to changes quickly. Being responsive to
environmental change is often difficult for larger organizations.
In this case, both the city manager and the city employees came to the board
with alternatives already narrowed to a particular solution. Following a bounded
rational approach, the board had to decide one way or the other, and the board
made the decision to fully privatize the WWTP. But, two weeks later, under
political pressure, the board reversed its earlier decision, following a different
decisional method. With the employees in front o f them presenting a comparable
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proposal to that which was recommended by the consultant and the city manager,
they made a snap decision to reverse their first decision and as one board member
said, “just give it a try.” In a reversal o f direction and decision methods, the board
maximized their political position by accepting the city employees proposal, and, in
effect, followed a public choice decision-making process. This blend o f bounded
rational and the public choice process is consistent with the city’s use o f a
contingency approach to decision making.

Decision-Making Environment
The environment in which this decision was made was very fragmented. In
examining the last year o f the board’s decisions, it became very clear that the board
is divided on several issues. One respondent characterized a board member as
making decisions “based on the union play book” and another as “being very free
market.”
The city manager indicated that board members were free to communicate
directly with senior staff, asking questions on issues coming before them for
decisions. A significant environmental factor was that long-term board members
knew the staff and had better access. This created a distinct advantage, and they
tended to use it to control the decision making on major decisions. This created a
decision environment consistent with elements o f the public choice model. At least
one board member was very disturbed about this informal “communication
environment.” Being a relatively new board member, she expressed extreme
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frustration at not having all the information that other board members had and not
having the same level o f influence. This same board member described a situation
where “employees would create an alliance with board members” to get the board to
change its position on issues. This alliance, common to governmental organizations,
may also be joined by a third party and is described as an iron triangle (Starling,
2005). The problem is that this alliance tends to destroy the decisional environment
by isolating key decision makers, as it did in this case.
Another significant environmental factor is the perceived complexity o f the
problem. If problems are perceived to be difficult and complex, board members tend
to depend on the staff or outside professionals, an indicator o f the contingency
model. If problems are familiar or seem simple, then they tend to make decisions
from an intuitive perspective, also an indicator o f a contingency model.
In this case, the board turned to consultants for help because the problem
seemed so complex. The consultants, using analytical tools, projected that the city
would save $1 million if they privatized the WWTP. Board meeting minutes
indicated that the board accepted this recommendation with few questions.
However, when the employees presented a comparable counter proposal* the
decision makers suddenly shifted from the analytic approach to an intuitive
assessment of the problem and proposed solution. The problem was simplified to
whether to privatize or contract with our existing labor force. The analytical
component o f the decisional process quickly took a back seat to the political process
o f deciding between two policy options. In the contingency theory o f decision
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making, decision makers turn to intuitive and experience-based political decision
approaches rather than a rational decision method.

Implementation and Evaluation
The implementation o f the board’s first decision to privatize was obviously
interrupted by the employee proposal. Reversing its initial decision and accepting the
employee proposal then became the issue in this case. Many decisions fail at the
point o f implementation, either from an initial improper decision or a failure to plan
for the outcomes. The implementation o f this decision was well planned and
documented. The employee proposal had specific goals with corresponding time
tables for each o f the steps. To ensure a successful implementation, the board
allowed for a three-year phased implementation.
Since the employee proposal followed very closely the recommendations o f
the consultant, the evaluation could also follow the consultant’s report, which
provided the necessary benchmarks upon which to evaluate the success o f a number
o f the proposed objectives. In addition to these objectives, the employee proposal
included changes in job classifications that took 12 classifications down to 4 and the
realignment o f jobs reduced the total number o f employees. These benchmarks
became the basis upon which the decision would be evaluated. Assessing efficiency
and effectiveness through benchmarking is an assumption o f the rational and
bounded rational decision process.
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Conclusions
The board entered this decision process from a bounded rational decision
making approach. However, as the case developed, the board’s decision-making
process changed and adapted to the contingencies o f an unstable organizational and
political environment. The facts o f this case indicate elements o f a bounded rational
decision model that was, however, driven by a contingency framework and evolved
into a decision method with elements o f the public choice model.
The board, city manager, and the senior staff applied varying decision
making models depending on the issue and the influencing environmental factors. As
is indicated in the contingency model, the decisional environment controlled the
alternatives considered and the solutions accepted. One o f the factors indicating the
contingency approach to decisions was an overdependence on management and
outside professionals. A number o f members on the board were relatively new when
the decision in this case confronted them. Lacking long-term history with the city
and city business seems to have created a higher level o f dependency on the city
manager and the staff. Out o f a seven-member board, only three, including the
mayor, could be said to have significant institutional memory. A lack o f knowledge
o f city business and its history tends to have the effect o f increasing dependence or
causing the decision maker to depend on their own knowledge. In this case, the
complexity o f the budgetary issues facing the city led to the decision to hire a
management consultant.
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Within the context o f the contingency theory, board members initially made
their decision from a bounded rational decision approach. The basis o f the board’s
initial decision was a consultant’s report indicating what was purported to be the
most efficient and effective solution. The board was reactive in their decisional
process, quickly adopting the consultant’s recommendation to privatize without
considering other alternatives. The board’s quick decision could be partially
explained by news articles and editorials which indicated that the public was
becoming increasingly more critical o f the board for its inability to deal with
excessive governmental costs.
Yet, in the face o f the board’s previous decision and under pressure from
employees, the board within two weeks reversed its original decision to privatize by
approving a comparable counter proposal from the WWTP employees. In this case,
employee pressure and the political environment were the contingencies that
dictated a shift in decision process to a public choice model. Given a new set o f
environmental factors and the board being divided on the issue o f privatization, the
decision makers chose the more politically acceptable solution, a competitive
agreement with employees.
Under the public choice decision model, decision makers tend to maximize
their political position. Thus, the unanimous vote in favor o f privatization was
converted to a unanimous vote in favor o f the employees. Respondents indicated
that when the employees presented a competitive counteroffer, this new solution
was more acceptable politically. In line with the public choice model, the board was
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able to avoid voting on the privatization o f a public service that might anger some
voters.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Overview

The purpose o f this research is to explore the nature o f local government
decision making in six Michigan cities. To effectively study the decision-making
process, it is important to identify an issue that is beyond typical daily decision
making, since day-to-day decisions in local government generally do not engage the
entire organization. From my experience, consideration o f whether to privatize
public services frequently generates a significant response internally and externally
to the organizational environment.
Each o f the cities in this study has a council-manager or commissionmanager form o f government. Under the council-manager form o f government, the
board appoints a city manager who is charged with the operation o f all day-to-day
activities in the municipality. City boards generally meet on a weekly or biweekly
basis for city business. As a part o f these meetings, the board discusses issues facing
the city and makes decisions regarding impending issues.
Even though the cities in this study have a common organizational structure
and a similar formal decision-making process, the cities did not follow a uniform
decision-making method. This research indicates that the cities in the study differed
significantly as to how they approached difficult decisions. In this chapter, I present
141
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conclusions and implications o f the research findings. After analyzing each o f the
cases separately in the findings, this section examines correlations between the cities.
Primary and secondary data indicate that most o f the cities had a bifurcated
use o f decisional models. During the initial or problem identification stage o f
decision making, each o f the cities appeared to be rational in their decision making.
Board discussion and materials often focused on the costs and the benefits o f the
solution or solutions being presented. However, as cities worked through their
respective decision processes, dominant decision approaches became apparent.

Communication in the Decision Process

One o f the significant findings o f this research supports the principle that a
cooperative decision-making environment is dependent on communication among
key decision makers. Figure 6 provides a descriptive view o f the decision
environment indicating the dominate decision making model used in each city.
Regardless o f the model or methods o f reaching a decision, failure to
communicate creates a negative decisional environment that may result in a lack o f
agreement on problem identification, a lack o f willingness to compromise on
solutions, slowing or even halting the decision process. A cooperative decision
environment is characterized by open and clear communication that encourages
discussion o f ideas and alternatives.
In examining the effect that the communication level has on the choice o f a
particular decision model, it can be observed that as the amount or quality o f
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Figure 6. Communications Effect on Decision-Making Process and Environment.

information goes down, the more likely it is that a public choice decision model will
be adopted. As communications and decision environment improve, the more likely
it is that a bounded rational decision process will be adopted.
One o f the board members in City A stated that the city manager tried to get
by with providing as little information as possible. This was also true o f City D,
where another board member indicated that he felt left out o f the loop. Both o f these
cities had long-term city managers that transitioned out o f their position as city
manager partly relating to the decisions in these cases. On the other hand, cities B, C
and E provided significant information to their boards and, in each o f these cities,
the decisional environment was very cooperative.
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City F depended on department staff and outside consultants to provide most
o f the information to the board. Communications in City F, while sufficient, were a
major issue o f contention with several board members. An informal communications
process in City F resulted in an unequal distribution o f information to board
members. This process left some board members feeling less informed and
distrustful o f the administration.
In the case o f significant public policy issues, as in these cases, most boards
depend heavily on the city manager and their staff to develop and communicate
potential solutions. It seems reasonable that larger communities would have more
staff and thus be better able to identify more alternatives and find appropriate
solutions. This was not found to be the case in this research. In fact, some o f the
smaller cities provided multiple alternatives with ranked alternatives. It is also true
that one o f the larger cities provided very little information on the issue to the
decision makers.
The identification and communication o f more than one alternative to the
board seems to be associated with a cooperative decision making environment. In
most o f the cases in this study, the administration had already narrowed the choices
to one or two options. In those cases where the board did not participate in that
narrowing o f the options, there was a distinct feeling o f a lack o f communication
from the perspective o f many board members. This feeling had in some cases risen
to the level o f distrust in the decision-making process. Often when there is distrust in
the rational information being provided by management, decision makers will then
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turn inward, and make judgments based upon their own field o f knowledge or
intuition.
How information is communicated to the board varied from city to city. In
the case o f City A, one board member did not want to communicate directly with
the city manager outside o f the formal decision-making setting. This method o f
communication was highly offensive to two very influential board members in City
A. These members felt that they were not getting the same or all the information as
other members. This feeling resulted in an environment o f distrust and led to a
breakdown o f communication between the board and the city manager. City C
decision makers also felt strongly that the manager should not meet individually with
board members to discuss city business. However, this informal decision making
step was central to many o f the other cities’ decision-making processes. In fact, in
City E, instead o f creating distrust between the board and the manager, it seems to
have had the opposite effect.
It is typical for cities to meet only twice a month. However, cities B, C, and
E all have a much greater number o f meetings per month than the others in this
study. These boards meet for informational workshops two or more times each
month in addition to the regular board meetings. This provides more than ample
time to communicate issues and to have feedback prior to submitting a
recommendation or the board deciding an issue. There appears to be a connection
between the number o f meetings and the level o f communication. Good
communication is a two-way street. An effective manager needs to actively solicit
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feedback from board members as to the type o f information and the level o f detail
that they require to make informed decisions.
Understanding the implications o f an effective communication process is
essential to any city’s decision making approach. In today’s information society, one
would think that effective communication would be a concept that is well
understood and applied in the field o f public administration. This research indicates,
however, that many local government managers fail to communicate well with their
board members, thereby impeding their ability to make good decisions. Quality
information, both written and verbal, is central to an organization’s ability to identify
problems and to find effective solutions. One board member said that “the key to
success if you want to stay in city management is to make sure that the board has
the information. Whether they read it or not is immaterial. You must make it
available to them.” From the results o f this study, this seems to be sage advice.
Interview data show that a high level o f communication, written and verbal,
quantitative and qualitative, between elected officials and senior staff leads to a
corresponding high level o f trust and cooperation in the decision process.

Problem Identification in the Decision Process

The initial identification o f problems and solutions is a key factor in
determining the type o f decision model followed by each city. Cities A, B, E, and F
all focused very quickly on a particular solution with little research or discussion o f
alternatives. This is partly related to how issues are identified and by whom. The
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interview data strongly indicate that those who identify the problem are also likely to
have a definite idea o f a solution to that problem. I f an elected board member
identifies a problem, data indicate that the solution is more likely to be a political
solution and follow a political model. This is clearly illustrated in City A, where a
board member presented both the problem and the solution at the same meeting.
The end result was a narrowing o f the alternatives. I f an elected board member
presents a problem along with a possible solution, the city manager and their staff
are likely to give more attention to that particular solution as compared to other
alternatives. To make a recommendation that does not include the advocate’s
solution would require an affirmative defense o f the substituted alternative.
As noted in the literature, it is not possible to know all the possible
alternatives, but it is likely that only those solutions that are known or can easily be
known to the manager will be identified (Simon, 1957). In fact, cities C and D were
the only cities that actually identified multiple alternatives and evaluated their
outcome prior to making a recommendation to the board. But, even in cities C and
D, a very limited range o f alternatives was considered. One or two alternatives were
presented with a recommendation for a specific alternative. In each o f these cases,
the manager narrowed the alternatives prior to taking the decision to the board.
Hence, the board was really weighing the merit o f a solution to a problem that was
identified by the advocate for a prevailing alternative. In the case o f City B, the
directors o f the individual departments typically identified the problems and
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presented solutions for those problems. This process narrowed the board’s focus to
the staff perception o f the causes o f the problem and solutions.
The implication o f narrowing the identification o f problems and solutions
presented to an elected board has a determinative effect on the choice o f decision
model. It becomes impossible for a board to make rational decisions if there is
incomplete information and limited alternatives. Hence, at best, a board will make
decisions following a bounded rational model. In fact, a board provided with
incomplete or poor information may shift to a more political decision approach such
as the public choice model.
Public administrators need to recognize that some elected officials may not
want a solution that is considered efficient. City managers tend to recommend
efficient solutions to problems, while board members may advocate for a political
solution. In theory, an effective manager should communicate all tenable
alternatives, indicating advantages and disadvantages for each option. Although the
manager is expected to give a policy recommendation, failure to present relevant
alternatives may bring into question a manager’s motives. A manager that provides
differing information to board members may be perceived as having a personal
agenda, thereby undermining confidence in the decision-making process and in the
manager as a leader
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Consensus Building in the Decision Process

Consensus building is an important step in the decision process, but cities
accomplish this in different ways. The council-manager form o f government gives
the specific authority to the city manager to carry out all day-to-day operations and
the board is charged with policy making. This separation o f responsibility and
authority sometimes leads to confusion when the decision makers operate outside
the roles defined by the charter.
In all o f the cities studied, the mayor plays an important part in consensus
building. In cities B, C and E, the mayor takes an active role in consensus building
throughout the decision-making process. In these cities, the mayor seeks out board
members before council consideration o f serious policy issues and seeks their
opinion and advice concerning the issue. That information is then relayed to the city
manager. The city manager uses that knowledge to determine whether to pursue the
issue, refine a recommendation, or to push ahead with limited support.
In some o f the cities in the study, the city manager is active in the role o f
consensus building. This is often used as a tool by managers to seek or judge the
level o f consensus among the board members. This informal step in the decision
making process is used quite successfully in cities B and E. The city manager meets
individually on a regular basis with each o f the board members to solicit their
opinions on various impending issues. When a serious issue arises during the course
o f municipal business, the manager o f City E will at times call individual board
members to poll them for their opinion.
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In some o f the cities in this study, there was opposition to the involvement of
the city manager in consensus building on the issues. In City A, two board members
did not want informal communication between the board and the city manager
because they felt that they were not receiving the same information as other board
members. In City C, both board members and the city manager were opposed to
informal communication outside o f formal board meetings. In cities A and D, there
was a high level o f distrust between board members and city staff. In City D, one
board member complained that the city manager would individually seek out board
members to communicate issues and to solicit their opinions.
The city manager in City D indicated that personal communications did take
place. He also advised that some o f the board would not give him an audience.
While it was not possible to know the contents o f the manager-board
communications, the secondary data, minutes, reports, and additional public
documents, indicated a regular level o f information flowing out o f the manager’s
office. The information was consistent with what would be provided in comparable
communities upon which a board would be expected to make a decision. Informal
communication was seen by some to be a violation o f the “neutral manager”
administrative process, where the manager’s role in the decision-making process, in
effect, becomes political. This perception led to hostile relationships between the
city staff and the board.
The policy decision o f whether to privatize a public service is often a difficult
decision requiring leadership to build consensus in the decision process. Public
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administrators have struggled for years with the role o f the manager in the public
policy-making process. The data in this research indicate that board members differ
on this question based upon their decision-making process. Cities operating from a
bounded rational decision approach more often used the city manager in conjunction
with the mayor to informally exchange information and build consensus as to
problems and solutions. On the other hand, cities A, D, and F created a wall o f
separation between administration and consensus building. The board members in
these cities were opposed to allowing the city manager and staff a role in the
consensus building process beyond submitting formal recommendations. This may
be related to the fact that these cities were operating from a public choice or
contingency approach to decision making. Cities that adopt a public choice or
contingency decision approach tend also have a low level o f organizational
communication and a lower level o f consensus on issues. This was indicated by an
increased level o f debate found in cities A, D, and F.
Applying this finding to the practice o f public administration, managers need
to be aware that, depending on a city’s decision approach, they may be expected to
assume the role o f consensus builder. Regardless o f whether the city manager plays
an active role in consensus building, nearly all cities have some type o f informal
consensus building mechanism as a part o f their decision-making process. This can
be used as an informal method o f communicating additional information or seeking
input from board members related to areas o f concern. Some public officials are
reluctant to ask relevant questions during televised board meetings. Others, on the
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other hand, may take the opportunity to ask questions that are politically charged
and meant to embarrass or stump a public administrator or staff member providing
the information. I would suggest that neither o f these situations is supportive o f the
local government decision process. An uninformed or misinformed decision maker
does not serve the public well.
The decision-making process can be expedited when one or two individuals
assume the role o f consensus builder. Questioning decision makers informally
concerning a difficult policy issue allows for the directed collection o f relevant
information related to specific decision maker’s concerns. This information then
becomes a part o f the information that is communicated to the entire board and the
public prior to a formal decision. Effective public administrators use consensus
building within their decision-making process as a way to confront difficult issues.
The role o f the consensus builder in the decision process is to help board members
reach agreement on policy issues.

Rationality in the Decision Process

While most local government organizations would like to be considered
rational in their decision process, not one o f the cities in this research followed
predominantly a rational model in their decision process. Proponents o f privatization
would like to suggest that government should become more businesslike in their
decision-making processes. By businesslike, these individuals often mean that
government decision makers should become more rational or efficient and effective
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in their decision outcome (Savas, 1987; Starr, 1989). For example, rational decision
makers, after reviewing and ranking all their available alternatives, should select the
most efficient solution (Rainey, 2003). Given the realities o f a democratic process
this is not usually the case in local government.
While cities C and E were very detailed and deliberate in their decision
process, neither met the standard o f the rational decision process. Both collected
and analyzed a number o f options prior to making a choice. They both, however,
limited the final alternatives to meet ends that they had predetermined. Hence, they
both failed to meet the standards o f the rational decision model. In defense o f these
progressive cities, I question whether business organizations would be better at
making “rational” decisions than these government organizations. Both business and
government operate in a world where there are limits to information and resources.
Both have uncontrollable contingencies that require less than optimal solutions at
times.
Applying this concept to public administration, administrators need to
recognize the fact that they may be forced to recommend a solution that is effective
but not economically efficient. A city may choose to provide a public service where
the market has failed or where there is insufficient profit to interest the private
sector. For example, there is no market for the ownership and operation o f senior
citizen centers. In this case, alternatives are limited by the lack o f availability o f
competition and public administrators are left with the responsibility o f creating
efficiencies in an area where they have a monopoly.
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Decision Making and Planning

In reviewing respondent data, this research found that the more extensive
and detailed a city’s planning process, the less likely it is that decisions will be
controlled by individuals or special interest groups. Democratic pluralism or
participation by many in our governance is a value that is undermined when
individuals can dictate policy. As can be seen in cities A and D in this research, one
very vocal individual in a key decision-making position can control or even alter a
city’s decision process. In City A, the board member, in effect, became the informal
leader o f the entire board and was, by all accounts, the informal mayor. In City D,
one board member built an alliance with a special interest group and, in effect,
challenged the rest o f the board and won. In each case, the result was the adoption
o f a public choice decision process.
On the other hand, cities that follow a detailed planning process are much
less likely to have their decision-making processes co-opted by individuals or special
interest groups as can be seen in cities B, C, and E. Each o f these cities had a
strategic decision-making process that was inclusive o f the public and employees.
The result was a more bounded rational decision making process.
Communities that took the time to do long-term or strategic planning during
the year did a much better job o f converting those plans into decisions and activities
during the year. Successful implementation o f decisions is directly related to
strategic planning. Successful implementation is defined by the execution o f the
board’s decision with public feedback indicating that the decision was acceptable.
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H alf o f the cities in this study had some form o f annual planning. In each o f
these cities, the decisional process was more likely to have characteristics o f a
bounded rational decision model, as can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Planning Process Effect on Decision-Making Process.

An important implication for the practice o f public administration is the
concept that effective decision making, at any level, begins with planning. A
comprehensive decision approach that incorporates an annual strategic planning
process provides the foundation for improved decision making. One facet o f the
strategic planning process is identification o f the mission, goals, and objectives o f
the organization. All decisions made throughout the year should be evaluated as to
whether the decision fits with the overall mission and accomplishes the stated
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objectives. When facing difficult decisions, public administrators, working with
elected officials, can strengthen the decision-making process by adhering to their
organization’s mission, goal and objectives. Decisions based upon an organization’s
strategic plan appear to produce more rational and consistent decisions. These
decisions follow a more bounded rational approach, rather than an intuitive decision
making approach.

Decision Making, Special Interest Groups, and Public Debate

Difficult decisions that have a high level o f citizen or employee input do not
automatically equate to a political decision process. In examining primary data and
confirming it with secondary data, it was found that both cities C and D had
significant public debate and citizen participation in their effort to reach a decision in
their respective cases. The problem and the resulting decision processes in both
cities spanned a long period o f time, over two years, attracting the attention o f the
media and citizens. Notwithstanding this public attention, the bounded rational
decision model was followed in City C. City D, however, in a very active political
environment, developed a public choice decision process when they had previously
had a history o f deciding from a bounded rational process.
Respondent data, confirmed by secondary data, indicate that cities A, B, E,
and F all had a low level o f citizen participation and response to their decisions.
News articles indicated that citizens were not happy with the decisions being made
in City F at the time, but they did not attend city meetings and express their
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concerns. In cities A, B, and E there was little to no response to their decisions. In
examining the decision approaches in each o f these cities, it can be seen that
regardless o f public debate, their decisions ranged from public choice in cities A and
F to bounded rational in cities B and E, as shown in Figure 8.

cd

ao

'■8

City C

V3

8U
©
u

Pk

Ml

C
3Cd
S
a©

-a
-o
a
s
o

C ityE
C itvB

CO

au>
U

«u

3
9

Om

Citv A. F

Citv D

Low Debate

High Debate
Public Debate

Figure 8. Public Debate Effect on Decision-Making Process.

Public administrators applying this conclusion to practice should be aware
that environmental factors such as vocal special interest groups, political instability,
and changes in leadership are all factors that have the potential ability to cause an
organization to alter its decision process. As political pressure increases, decision
makers may be tempted to make decisions without adequate information or without
taking enough time to consider all o f the available alternatives. The contingency
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model used in this research helped to identify and understand shifts in decisional
processes as a result o f environmental factors. With an understanding o f the political
contingencies that may steer the organization toward a shift in decision approach,
public administrators can take the steps necessary to keep the decision process on
track.
Special interest groups have always played a part in the local government
decision-making process. Some would argue that democratic pluralism is essentially
the process by which all public choices are made. This study found that the decision
making process in half o f the cities in this study were significantly influenced by
special interest groups. In each o f those cities, environmental contingencies pushed
the cities into a more political or subjective public choice decision approach. This
change was often the result o f board members that were speaking directly on behalf
o f the special interest group. City A, the city service debate, and City D, the
recreation facility debate, are examples o f cities that had their typical decision
making processes co-opted by board members representing special interest groups.
Any public administrator caught in the middle o f a special interest debate can
attest to the power and influence that one or two board members can have on the
decision-making process. It is critical for local government leaders to recognize and
effectively balance this organizational factor during their decision process. Public
administrators who fail to pick up on these environmental factors may lose control
o f their decision process. To effectively deal with issues, managers need to actively
engage special interest board members to seek solutions.
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Recommendations for Future Research

The focus o f this research was on decisional approaches used by local
government officials in their decision whether or not to privatize public services. As
a part o f that analysis, environmental factors that affected the decision approach
were studied. Due to research limitations, not all possible environmental factors
were studied. For example, there exists a growing body o f literature that examines
the effect o f internal and external networks on decision making. A recommendation
for future research would include an analysis o f the effects o f formal and informal
networks on the decision processes. Public administrators participate in and are
influenced by formal and informal networks from which they collect information.
For example, city managers often network with other city managers regarding
problems and solutions. What effect these connections have on their
recommendations and their organization’s decisional approach would be o f great
interest.
Along this same line o f thought would be the recommendation o f further
research examining the form o f government on the adoption o f a decision-making
process. This research could be expanded to include non-city manager forms o f
government, making it possible to compare potential effects on the decision
approach. Only about one half o f the cities in the United States have a city manager
form o f government.
The research presented in this study adds to an emerging body o f empirical
knowledge about the political aspects o f local government decision making. The
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contingency decision-making model was included in this research in an effort to
capture the reasons behind shifts in local governmental decision processes. While
there were shifts in decision approaches observed in the respondent data, supported
by secondary data, the study was not long enough to indicate whether they were
temporary shifts. A time series study o f this data would allow a longitudinal
examination o f whether local government decision makers changed their decision
styles temporarily or whether the observed shifts in decision process were long
term. A time series analysis would also allow an examination o f whether these cities
were satisfied long-term with their decisions.
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It is hoped that by exploring and gaining an understanding o f this difficult and often contentious
decision that w e can assist public officials to improve the quality o f the choices they make.
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Survey Instrument

Survey Questions:

Problems:
P -l

What were the most significant factors influencing your decision to contract
out public services?

P-2

Were you having employee problems before the decision to pursue
privatization? After union problems?

P-3

What were the circumstances leading up to the decision to contract out
public services?

P-4

Were there any unusual circumstances that come to mind leading up to the
decision to contract out public services?

Solutions:
S -l

What solutions or alternatives were considered?

S-3

What solutions found their way to the agenda for consideration and why?
Were there some solutions that did not seem feasible?

S-2

Was the decision to contract out a good opportunity for the city?

Mechanisms or processes:
M -l

How are decisions made in the city?

M-2

Is there a formal decision making process that is used by the city?

M-3

What part does the public play in the city decision making process?

M-4

What part do employees play in the decision making process?

M-5

How did the city come to the decision to contract out public services?

M-6

How did the administration communicate the decision to contract out?
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Key Participants:
K -l

Who is involved in the decision making process?

K-2

Who was involved in the decision to contract out public services and what
was their respective role in that process?

K-3

Who has the authority to make decisions in the city?

K-4

Who advocated the decision to contract out public services?

K-5

Who was the major consensus builder regarding the decision to contract
out?

K-6

On what information did you base your decision to contract out public
services?

K-7

Where did you get your information regarding the privatization o f public
services?

K-8

How much and what type o f information did you have to make your
decision?

K-9

Looking back was there any information that you wish you had that you did
not and why? Did you feel like you had all the information that you needed
to make the right decision?

Environment:
E -l

What was the economic condition o f the city when you decided to contract
out? How much influence did this factor have on your decision?

E-2

Did the advocate for privatization stand to benefit in any way from the
decision to contract out?

E-3

Did you encounter any opposition to the decision to contract out?

E- 4

Did all o f the board agree on the decision or did you have a split vote on the
issue? Did the split seem to agree with previous voting patterns or did a
new pattern emerge? Did anyone try to build a consensus? Why or why
not?
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